Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations | 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1997-03

Military and civilian relationships: do they affect integrated product teams?

Stenger, Gail

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26071

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

http://www.nps.edu/library

Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

NPS ARCHIVE
1997.03
STENGER, G.

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS: DO THEY AFFECT INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS?

by

Gail Stenger

March 1997

Co-Advisors: Susan Hocevar
Linda Wargo

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Thesis
S6865

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY	2. REPORT DATE March 1997	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS: DO THEY AFFECT INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS?	5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Stenger, Gail	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE:

13. ABSTRACT *(maximum 200 words)*

The implementation of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) concept by the Department of Defense to support the acquisition process assumes that service members and DoD civilians work together productively to produce effective weapon systems. This thesis investigates military-civilian relationship issues on IPTs.

Interviews were conducted with twenty-three DoD civilians and service members who have participated in Department of Defense IPTs. These interviews were consolidated and issues shared by a majority of the interviewees are presented and analyzed in terms of the existing literature on inter-group conflict. All interviewees stated that these group stereotypes had no negative impact on IPT performance.

Conclusions reached were that military and civilians do have positive and negative perceptions regarding the other group, and based on existing literature, these issues present challenges for the two groups to work together productively when both participate in IPTs. Models from the research literature on intergroup conflict are used to provide recommendations for addressing intergroup perceptions and improving the effectiveness of IPTs.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Military -Civilian Relationships, Personnel Relationships, Systems Acquisition, Integrated Product Teams			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 121 16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS: DO THEY AFFECT INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS?

Gail Stenger
Civilian, United States Army
B.S., Monmouth College, 1985

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1997

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

ABSTRACT

The implementation of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) concept by the Department of Defense to support the acquisition process assumes that service members and DoD civilians work together productively to produce effective weapon systems. This thesis investigates military-civilian relationship issues on IPTs.

Interviews were conducted with twenty-three DoD civilians and service members who have participated in Department of Defense IPTs. These interviews were consolidated and issues shared by a majority of the interviewees are presented and analyzed in terms of the existing literature on inter-group conflict. All interviewees stated that these group stereotypes had no negative impact on IPT performance.

Conclusions reached were that military and civilians do have positive and negative perceptions regarding the other group, and based on existing literature, these issues present challenges for the two groups to work together productively when both participate in IPTs. Models from the research literature on intergroup conflict are used to provide recommendations for addressing intergroup perceptions and improving the effectiveness of IPTs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. BACKGROUND 1

B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 3

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 4
1. Primary Research Question 4
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 4

D. SCOPE 4

E. METHODOLOGY 5

F. LIMITATIONS 5

G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 6

II. LITERATURE REVIEW 7

A. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND TEAM SUCCESS 7

B. TEAM MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 9

C. EFFECTIVE TEAMS 13

D. INTER-GROUP CONFLICT 14

E. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 17

F. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS 20

G. SUMMARY 28

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 31

A. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 31

B. GENERAL RESEARCH STRATEGY 31

C. CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH 32
1. Interview Participants 32
2. Collecting the Data 32

IV. RESEARCH DATA PRESENTATION 39

A. INTRODUCTION 39

B. SERVICE MEMBERS' ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH DOD CIVILIANS.....40
1. Continuity of Civilians 40
2. Motivation of Civilians.....42
3. Leadership.....45
4. Time.....46

C. WHAT DO SERVICE MEMBERS THINK OF US (CIVILIANS)?.....49

D. DOD CIVILIAN ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY.....51
1. Rotation and Equity of Career Opportunities.....51
2. Military Evaluation System 54
3. Military Adjustment from Management of an Operational Environment to a Business Organization 56
4. Military Culture.....58

E. WHAT DO CIVILIANS THINK OF US (THE MILITARY)?.....60

F. AFFECT OF BIAS AND CONFLICT ON TEAM PERFORMANCE 62

G. SUMMARY.....63

V. ANALYSIS 65

A. INTRODUCTION.....65

B. SERVICE MEMBERS' ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH DOD CIVILIANS 66
1. Continuity of Civilians 66
2. Motivation of Civilians.....67
3. Leadership.....69
4. Time.....72

C. DOD CIVILIAN ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY.....73
1. Rotation and Equity of Career Opportunities 73
2. Military Evaluation System 76
3. Military Adjustment from Management of an Operational Environment to a Business Organization 78
4. Military Culture.....79

D. INTER-GROUP CONFLICT 81
1. Literature Review 81

2. Interview Results 82
3. Implications for IPTs 82

E. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 85
1. Results of Literature Review 85
2. Interview Results 86
3. Implications for IPTs 86

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 89

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 93

A. FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE 93

B. FINDINGS FROM THIS RESEARCH EFFORT 95

C. PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE SUCCESS OF AN IPT COMPRISED OF SERVICE MEMBERS AND CIVILIANS 99

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING GROUP CONFLICT 101

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 103
1. Analogous Research Conducted by a Service Member 103
2. Conduct Survey on Biases and Stereotypes of Civilians and Service Members 103
3. Conduct Research to Determine How Biases and Stereotypes Can Be Reduced 103

LIST OF REFERENCES 105

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 109

I. INTRODUCTION

The exploration of military and civilian relationships as they impact Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) was chosen for a study topic for the following reasons. Most important, the Integrated Product Team concept is pertinent to the current Army Acquisition environment. As the defense budget shrinks, the Services must find more efficient ways to develop and procure weapon systems. Industry is using the IPT concept to improve the way they do business; the Department of Defense acknowledges this success and has adapted the concept for their use. The success of these multi-functional teams requires the involvement and effective integration of all players, both military and civilian personnel.

As a DoD civilian with experience in Program Management (PM) offices and a Program Executive Office (PEO), the researcher has witnessed interactions between military and civilian personnel. This first-hand experience prompted further exploration of how these two groups interact in an IPT environment, the existence of possible inter-group biases between the groups, and the effect any differences have on IPT performance.

A. BACKGROUND

The Secretary of Defense directed the Services to implement the Integrated Product Team concept in May 1995 (Perry, 1995). DoD Directive 5000.1 and Regulation 5000.2-R (1996), reflect that direction by stating that the Department

perform as many acquisition functions as possible using IPTs. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (1996) defines an IPT as representatives of appropriate functional disciplines working together with a team leader to build successful and balanced programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and timely recommendations to facilitate decision making.

The Department has directed that IPTs function in a spirit of teamwork with participants authorized and empowered (to the maximum extent possible) to make commitments for the organization or functional area they represent (DoD Directive 5000.1, 1996). This Department of Defense regulation states that the IPT concept must stress the following principles:

- Open, qualified discussions, with no secrets
- Qualified, empowered team members
- Continuous, "up-the-line" communications
- Consistent, success oriented, participation
- Reasoned disagreement
- Issues raised and resolved

In order to facilitate the IPT concept, team members must view each other as valuable contributors to the process, each with an equal voice in the group. The IPT concept may require team members to change the way DoD acquisition business has been done in the past as the military environment may not view all

members as equals. An example of this is civilians stating that they are treated as second class citizens (Broedling, 1979; Wermuth, 1979; and Woolley).

This thesis will focus on the relationship of the principal members of the Army Acquisition Corps' IPTs: military officers and Department of Defense (DoD) civilians. These two employee groups are expected to work harmoniously and productively in IPTs although they come from different professional cultures. These different professional backgrounds create a possibility for conflict and tension in an IPT. The groups may also have biases and negative stereotypes about each other which could aggravate any existing conflict and tension. Prior to their Acquisition Corps experience, these two groups have worked together infrequently and know little about how the other group operates (Skinner, 1991). This lack of direct experience can lead to a greater reliance on stereotypes that can interfere with productive interaction (Amir, 1979).

B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This thesis will provide a qualitative analysis of possible inter-group biases on Integrated Product Teams in the Department of Defense. It describes experiences of DoD civilians and military officers while they served on IPTs that were composed of civilians and military officers. The results provide insight for people involved in IPTs and identify what influence military or civilian bias may have on team performance.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary Research Question

What are the attitudes and assumptions that military officers and DoD civilians, who have served on Acquisition Corps IPTs, have towards each other and how can those attitudes affect team performance?

2. Subsidiary Research Questions

a. What does the existing literature say about the perceptions that DoD civilians and military officers have towards each other?

b. What do current IPT members state about the assumptions and attitudes that Acquisition Corps military officers and DoD civilians have towards each other?

c. Given the research results, what can be predicted about the success of the two groups working together in IPTs?

d. Given the research, how can diversity be managed to ensure team success?

D. SCOPE

This paper focuses on the use of employees with different professional and cultural backgrounds in Integrated Product Teams. It reviews existing research and conducts new investigations of the assumptions and attitudes that each group has towards each other. Existing research is used as a basis for further

investigation. The results of the new research are analyzed and further hypotheses generated regarding the likely influence of these attitudes on the effectiveness of IPTs. In addition, the literature is reviewed for suggestions to support these two different groups working together more successfully in IPTs.

E. METHODOLOGY

The literature is reviewed to investigate the affect cultural differences and inter-group biases have on teams and whether team members' attitudes and assumptions about each other affect team performance. Existing research is reviewed and new research is conducted to determine what attitudes and assumptions the groups have towards each other. The data received from the research questions are qualitative. They are derived from interviews with both military and civilian personnel who have direct experience working with IPTs.

F. LIMITATIONS

This study does not review the use of TQM theory or if IPTs should be used. It does not review the structure or organization of the Acquisition Corps or a Project Manager's office.

A limitation of the research is the use of a small sample size. The small sample of 23 interview subjects was required due to intensive methodology of in-depth interviews and time constraints for research completion. This may limit

generalizability to Department of Defense acquisition organizations that employ IPTs due to the limited number of interviews conducted.

G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis is divided into six chapters beginning with Chapter I which provides an introduction to the subject, a justification for the research, and a discussion of research questions and organization of the thesis. Chapter II contains a review of existing literature on cultural biases and their impact on team success, characteristics of successful teams, team conflict, team conflict management and attitudes of DoD civilians and military officers towards each other. Chapter III details the selection of the research strategy, choice of personnel to be interviewed, data gathering methodology and the approach to data reduction on research results. Chapter IV describes research results from the interviews, including lessons learned. Chapter V discusses what issues emerge from the interviews in terms of the literature reviewed on attitudes of military and civilian personnel towards the other group and the characteristics of effective teams. Chapter VI develops conclusions and recommendations for future study.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this section is to provide a brief introduction to the affect of cultural diversity on team success, team management and the Federal Government, characteristics of effective teams, group conflict, conflict management and existing research on civilian and military employees related to this thesis research. A literature search was conducted through the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and the library at the Naval Postgraduate School to enlighten the author on the topics noted above.

A. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND TEAM SUCCESS

During a literature review of cultural diversity, the author found that successful private sector companies are well represented in the literature. There are numerous descriptions of the affect of cultural differences on organizations with conclusions that cultural differences need to be recognized to achieve success (Bartunek, 1996; Harris, 1987; Sackman, 1991; Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). Cultural literature addresses the great opportunities which are presented by the diversity of members of different cultures. These advantages include greater potential and creativity from the synergy of the workforce, recapturing commitment and releasing unused talent (Jaminson and O'Mara, 1991).

Managers can no longer assume that all employees have the same cultural perspective or that employees with different cultural backgrounds can be forced to fit into a standard corporate mold, where white males comprise the dominant majority. By the year 2000, the minority share of the workforce will grow to 25 percent (from 17 percent in the late 1980s), women will comprise 50 percent of the workforce and 30 percent of the workforce will be over 45 years old (versus an average age of 28 in 1970) (Jamenson and O'Mara, 1991). With these changes in the workforce, organizations must realize that employees cannot be stereotyped but must recognize and work with these diverse groups.

Diverse groups have been shown to make higher quality decisions, due to the group's ability to think in more realistic and complex ways about its choices and the group's ability to relate better to its customers (Milliken, 1996; Schneider, 1996). Diverse groups have also been shown to benefit from the communications that take place with non-group members whom the group may depend on for resources, information and acceptance (Milliken, 1996). The willingness of outsiders to accept and provide information to the group may depend on the outsider believing that their views are represented within the group; a diverse workgroup is more likely to, at least, recognize that "outsider's" viewpoint (Milliken, 1996).

An organization's beliefs, attitudes, procedures, practices and priorities are reflected in the way the team itself functions (Harris and Moran, 1987). The literature emphasizes that, in order to gain the potential benefits of team management theory, cultural differences must be addressed (Bartunek, 1996; Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). If an organization has an indifferent and unaccepting attitude towards sub-group cultures, it is not recognizing the potential contributions of all members in the workforce and it is not using all the talent and resources available.

B. TEAM MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Total Quality Management has been shown to increase organizational productivity and quality, help organizations accomplish their goals more efficiently and improve performance through the use of teams. The benefits the commercial sector has gained from Total Quality Management and the use of teams has been recognized by the Federal Government and is seen as a necessary ingredient if the Federal Government is to reinvent itself and improve the way it provides services to the taxpayer. This recognition is found in numerous references, including the Vice President's National Performance Review (Gore, 1993). This document recommends that the Government's efforts be customer focused and strive towards continuous improvement of products and services provided to the public.

Team management theory must be utilized if the Government wants to implement and succeed as a Total Quality Management organization (Cohen, 1993; Fargher, 1992; Federal Quality Institute, 1994). The Federal Quality Management Institute, in their review of eight Federal organizations that won the President's Award for Quality, noted that all of the organizations utilized team management to align efforts in support of the customer. For example, the Air Force's 653rd Communications-Computer Systems group used cross-functional teams to analyze operating processes. They placed a high premium on teamwork and cross-training to facilitate each team member's understanding of the requirements of the others in the group; these teams enabled the members to work together and use group problem solving tools (Federal Quality Management Handbook, 1994).

The San Francisco Region of the Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, found that the use of self-managed teams was effective in addressing areas of widespread violations in specific industries or localities. When the region changed its focus from enforcement to compliance, it involved all employees in planning. As a result of this change, two thirds of the work of the staff is now carried out by self-directed teams. As noted by the Federal Quality Institute, the use of teams and the associated empowerment of employees has contributed to the success of every organization cited in the 1994 report.

Another source of Government TQM success stories is the Report on Productivity and Quality Improvement in Government (1991). This document highlights the successful use of teams in support of Total Quality Management. One organization cited in the report is the Department of the Navy Office of Civilian Personnel Management, who initiated a long-term project to incorporate quality principles in all aspects of their operations. An important aspect of their implementation effort was the use of teams to identify quality improvements and create or revise services.

The 1991 report also cited the Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station as a TQM success story. As part of their implementation of TQM, they established a team-oriented process improvement and problem-solving methodology. This involved all employees and emphasized behaviors and approaches to business and management practices which support teamwork. The team approach was applied in an engineering and scientific environment, which was a unique application of total quality principles, as total quality had previously been focused on manufacturing and production processes.

As these Government organizations' experiences illustrate, Total Quality Management and the use of teams improves processes and products. These organizations have shown that a management style of working as individuals does not have as great an impact on quality improvement as self directed teams.

The IPT concept capitalizes on attributes of the TQM concept and extends the emphasis on quality via the implementation of integrated teams. Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Ssecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (1995) stated that the IPT concept works with the strengths of all participants in the acquisition process to develop programs with the highest opportunity for success and creates teams out of historically adversarial relationships between headquarters and program offices. Dr. Kaminski also emphasized the importance of working as a cross-functional team to maximize overall performance.

The Department of Defense has based its implementation of IPTs on the Air Force's success with the process at the Air Force Materiel Command in 1992. This organization implemented a new acquisition management philosophy combining the development and logistics elements and allowing for a cradle to grave systems management concept. The process made the program director the focal point for the customer by increasing the director's authority and flexibility over the program, integrating all of the acquisition processes and eliminating the gaps that existed between development and support elements (Przemieniecki, 1993). Based on this success, the Department of Defense incorporated the concept into their acquisition procedures.

Despite the successes shown by the commercial sector, no research was found by the author which documented Government improvements gained with the

use of the IPT process. Although DoD has little experience with IPTs, and the research is limited in documenting its successful implementation, the Department of Defense is emphasizing wide use of the approach in its acquisition affairs, based on the success shown in the commercial sector.

C. EFFECTIVE TEAMS

The Government has directed that the Defense Acquisition community utilize teams to the maximum extent. The successful implementation of IPTs depends on the effective functioning of the teams formed to support this initiative.

Katzenbach and Smith (1991) discuss the components of effective teams. The authors state that effective teams encourage listening and constructive response to views expressed by other team members, provide support, give others the benefit of the doubt, and recognize the interests and achievements of others. Teams have shared leadership roles, individual and mutual accountability, collective work products; discuss, decide and perform real work together; and hold open-ended discussions and problem solving meetings. Good teams also have specific team purposes that the team itself delivers and measures performance by assessing collective work products.

The research states that the essence of a team is common commitment. Without common commitment, groups do not perform as teams but as individuals; with common commitment, individuals use collective performance to work as a

strong team. These authors state that strong teams should determine how schedules will be set and adhered to.

The authors state that team members should possess good problem solving and decision making skills and technical or functional expertise. Team members also require good interpersonal skills include risk-taking, helpful criticism, objectivity, active listening, giving the benefit of the doubt and recognizing the interests and achievements of others. Mutual understanding, discovery and understanding of how to apply all its human resources to a common purpose are issues which should be addressed and implemented in an effective team. The authors also state that the team should spend time together to create a personal bond and give the group time to learn to be a team.

D. INTER-GROUP CONFLICT

Service members and Department of Defense civilians work together on teams, however, these groups may hold biases towards the other group (i.e., civilians may have biases regarding service members; service members may have biases about civilians). Each group may identify with their own professional group (i.e. "in-group") and have biases about the other professional group (i.e., "out-group"). Biases that a group holds about an out-group may cause conflict that may interfere with team performance.

Research on inter-group conflict has been presented by Stephan and Stephan (1985) which shows that inter-group conflict may be produced by interactions with out-group members, whether or not the two groups have had previous contact. Conflict may be caused by feared negative consequences:

- feelings of embarrassment, incompetence, confusion and frustration due to their own group's behavior or the other group's behavior
- exploitation or domination of individual by other group
- disapproval and rejection by members of the other group (out-group members will see you as inferior)
- disapproval and rejection by members of the individual's group (in-group will disapprove of the person's relationship with out-group)

These feared negative consequences may result in the following behaviors:

- avoidance of the other group
- hesitation and withdrawal from interaction with the other group
- out-group members are blamed for poor performance and any positive behavior may be disregarded
- self-esteem is threatened
- exaggerate positive or negative interactions (positive experience will seem very good, negative experience will look very bad)

Brown (1983) states that too much conflict produces strong negative feelings, blindness to interdependencies and uncontrolled escalation of aggressive action and counteraction. Conflict between two individuals may be due to

personal feelings, job differences, group membership, or all three. Managers may assume that conflict is due to the individuals involved, implying that the problem can be solved by replacing the individual. If the conflict is the result of group membership (e.g., military or civilian), the pressures of in-group identification and out-group bias may have an impact within and between the groups involved. If conflict between the groups escalate, this may encourage a view of "us versus them" and negative stereotypes, increasing the emphasis of differences, resulting in decreased or distorted communications.

Brown adds that the introduction of power differences to intergroup relations further suppresses communications between the groups. The low power group is vulnerable to the high power group, and may censor communication to that group. The high power group may remain ignorant of information considered sensitive and withheld by the other group. The long term result may be mutually reinforced fear and ignorance and may escalate to intense and sporadic fighting.

Brown states that the importance of conflict resolution skills is increasing due to our increasingly interdependent and heterogeneous world. The chances for conflict is increasing rapidly and management of conflict among groups is important to organizational survival.

Jehn (1995) states that conflict may cause an individual to experience frustration, strain and uneasiness in the group experience and result in

psychological or physical withdrawal from the group. People who feel friction with each other or experience personality clashes work less effectively, produce sub-optimal products and may lose perspective about the task being performed. In addition, groups that experience conflict may spend time trying to resolve, ignore or discuss the conflict instead of dedicating time to the task to be performed.

E. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

As stated above, Brown (1983) argues that conflict management is a crucial skill for those who lead modern organizations. Conflict is common in organizations and should be managed, but often goes unrecognized. Too much or too little conflict may be detrimental to an organization.

Conflict may be due to organizational differences (e.g., engineering versus production) power differences (due to one's placement in the organization) or societal history (racial differences, religious groups). To address conflict, Brown suggests diagnosing the conflict. Brown's diagnosis technique includes the examination of attitudes, behaviors and structures.

Attitudes are defined as the orientation of groups and group members to their own and other groups. This tells the extent to which groups (and their members) are aware of group interdependencies, the group knowledge about intergroup relations, and feelings and stereotypes within groups. Too much conflict may mean blindness to interdependencies and the cost of conflict, as well

as strong negative feelings and stereotypes. Too little conflict may mean the group is blind to conflicts of interest, the cost of collusion, and is unaware of group differences.

Brown's diagnosis continues with the examination of cohesion and conformity by group members and the presence and level of intergroup conflict or cooperation. Excessive conflict results in overly competitive actions and increasing aggression among groups. Insufficient conflict means undefined or fragmented groups and extreme cooperative actions instead of the examination of differences.

Brown concludes his diagnosis technique with an examination of structures which influence interactions in the long run: larger systems that individuals belong to, structural mechanisms which connect the parties, group boundaries and long term interests. Too much conflict means a lack of techniques to link the groups, clearly defined and conflicting group interests, and few rules to limit conflict. Too little conflict is encouraged by a shared larger system which suppresses the conflict, few mechanisms to examine differences, vague definitions of conflicting group interests and identities and regulations that discourage conflict.

Brown suggests moderate conflict is desired for team effectiveness. This level of conflict is associated with a high degree of energy and information exchange. While too much conflict may be counter-productive and too little

conflict may inhibit communications, a reasonable degree of conflict, appropriate to the group and its task, is desirable.

Cox (1991) lists numerous techniques to reduce conflict and bias in groups: training and orientation, insuring minority group acceptance, new member orientation, career development, revamping reward systems to reinforce conflict and diversity management, mentoring, social events, and bias reduction training.

Messick and Mackie (1989) cite methods to improve intergroup relations. These include increased interpersonal contacts between the groups, change directed by law or regulation (e.g., anti-discrimination laws), conflict resolution, bargaining and negotiation, changing the out-group stereotype through direct contact, and diminishing the intensity of in-group identification. The authors added that direct interpersonal contact helps reduce negativity.

Amir (1969) endorses the benefits of individual exposure to other groups to change individuals' beliefs towards each other. Additionally, Amir states that institutional support (e.g., equal employment initiatives) helps to increase understanding between groups by reinforcing social desirability of interaction.

F. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS

While the literature cites many instances of team success and the necessary recognition and inclusion of different cultures to ensure success of the team, the literature does not specifically address the effect of integrating the two major cultures present in the Department of Defense that work on IPTs: military and civilian cultures. Although the literature does not cite instances and effects of military and civilian relationships on Integrated Product Teams, it does address the general relationship between these two groups.

Broedling (1979) examined the relationship between military and civilians via interviews, observations and questionnaires for the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center. The study researched the nature of the civilian executive jobs, including the military-civilian executive interface. The research found that civilian executives interacted closely with military executives and all of the interviewees stated that the military-civilian interface was important to the effective functioning of the Navy. All civilians interviewed felt the fact that their jobs are embedded in a military system has implications for their duties. In addition to interviews, this study reports a questionnaire in which military and civilians were asked to rate a series of questions on a scale of zero (not at all true) to seven (very true). When asked if there is a productive partnership between military and civilian executives in commands where they work together, the

civilian executives responded with an average score of 5.3 (standard deviation (SD) = 1.3) while the military executives had a mean score of 6.3 (SD = 1.0). When asked if civilian executives in the shore establishment are often treated as "second class citizens," civilian executives responded with a mean score of 4.3 (SD = 1.9) and military executives responded with a score of 2.8 (SD = 1.5). The results show that civilians were not as positive as the military in rating the productive partnership between the two groups. In addition, civilians see themselves as second class citizens while the military do not perceive that civilians are treated in this way. These findings were statistically significant ($p < .05$), which indicates a high amount of discrepancy between their attitudes toward each other and their relationship. The study noted that the civilian-military relationship should be improved.

Young's (1985) research cites that the two groups in the civilian-military relationship are significantly different in many ways and this helps to explain different perspectives on certain issues. These differences include the wearing of the uniform, the salute, the caste-like system of officers and enlisted personnel, military quarters which are separated from the civilian element, and the transient nature of the military. Young stated that the two groups need to not let these differences interfere with the need for these groups to cooperate and produce in a working relationship. A relationship that has been nurtured through emphasis on

common bonds (with the recognition of differences) can provide a leader with the support necessary to implement a difficult decision.

Skinner (1993) focused on Total Army Culture and the importance of civilians to the team effort. Skinner states that some Army civilians were not accepted as an essential part of the team. He based this statement on results of surveys which identified military and civilian perceptions regarding the other group, value differences, and systemic differences between the military and civilian personnel management systems as factors that have a negative impact on Total Army Culture. Skinner also states that the cultural gap between civilian and military cultures needs to be bridged in order to create a Total Army Culture.

Skinner states that the military does not understand the civilian workforce and the civilian workforce does not fully understand the customs, traditions and operations of the Army. He suggests a better integration of the civilian and military members of the Total Army into a uniform corporate culture is required to improve the performance of the organization. Skinner states that the two subcultures did not share the same core values and the underlying systemic causes create a separation between military and civilian subcultures. These systemic problems include an ineffective and complex personnel management system; poor communications; apathy among military leaders; failure of the system to support the employee, manager or Army mission accomplishment; and the failure of Army

leaders to provide effective leadership to Army civilians. The result of the separation between the subcultures are civilians who neither feel, nor are accepted, as an essential part of the Total Army Team.

Wermuth (1979) suggests that no future system intending to use more civilians will be successful unless attitudes and practices tending to impose second class citizenship on civilians in the military establishment are eliminated. Wermuth states that, as a uniformed military officer, he had greatly overrated his knowledge of Army civilians and that broader research is required to reduce misunderstandings that exist in military-civilian organizations.

Long (1977) found that close military contact with civilians improves officers' attitudes towards civilians. Officers surveyed state that civilians are not willing to work more than 40 hours per week in order to do a good job and perceived that civil service employees wait out the transfer of an officer to avoid doing something with which they disagree.

Bridger (1994) states that mixing the civilian and military systems frequently leads to misunderstandings with members of both sides feeling unappreciated. This is illustrated by civilian employees who state that service members 1) would be happier without civilians, 2) have no knowledge of civilian personnel rules and 3) simply dictate to their civilian employees because they are the boss. Military officers are often frustrated with civilian employee management

due to the rules which dictate civilian personnel policy, including the civilian use of compensatory time and overtime which service members do not receive. The gap between service members and civilians is marked by perceptions that the two groups hold about each other. Service members perceive that civilians must, at times, be motivated to perform and are less responsive to and feel less respect for service members, but add that civilians are needed for their institutional knowledge. Civilians may assume that a service member knows nothing about the management and rating of civilians (Bridger, 1994). An American Federation of Government Employees official stated that:

> Many officers have no knowledge of the civilian sector and they don't bother finding out the personnel rules. They just dictate...that's the way it is because I am the boss. Sometimes captains and lieutenants don't understand why they can't order a civilian around like they can a private." (Bridger, 1994, p. 14)

The author notes that as we become more interdependent and as the Services open more opportunities to civilians that were traditionally held by military, it is necessary that civilians and military work more closely together.

Woolley, et al (1986) conducted research to formulate a strategic plan to guide future research on the Army's civilian personnel workforce. The goal of this research was to provide a framework for developing a knowledge base which could lead to improved management of the civilian personnel workforce. Sixty-five Army officers and civilians were interviewed and asked to offer suggestions

about significant issues which would warrant future research. The results showed that the effectiveness of the military-civilian relationship was an issue requiring further research. The two groups expressed concern over many aspects of the relationship. For example, civilian respondents reported feeling like second class citizens in the Army structure. This perception was validated by military respondents to the study. In addition, the majority of respondents to the study emphasized the difference between the military and civilian occupational cultures in that a military officer can see a direct link between training and promotion while civilians see little relationship. Study participants acknowledged that military are ill-informed about the complexities of the civilian personnel system and critical of those parts of it which seem to interfere with their ability to manage their workforce.

Each group was critical of the other group's knowledge and experience supervising their group. Civilians criticized military concentration on cash awards as the sole method to recognize civilian achievement while alternate means of recognition are available. Service memebers criticized civilian concentration on time: "We [the military] have to stay and you guys [civilians] get to go home" (Woolley, et al ,1986, p. 79).

A strategy suggested by the study would involve the transition of knowledge about each culture to members in the other culture. Both cultures

would systematically acquire knowledge about the other culture as part of their professional training. The study found that research should be designed to systematically ascertain differences in value systems between the military and civilian subcultures and ways in which the two cultures are detrimental to a climate of respect.

Apple states in his 1973 thesis that the potential for conflict between military personnel and civil servants at the working level is a constant threat to the Air Force manager. The Department of Defense faces many situations that are not normally encountered in civilian organizations; personnel problems arise from the fact that the Department of Defense combines two distinct career services, the professional military and civil servants. Factors that degrade the relationship between the two groups would also tend to degrade the overall management function. Apple argues that a major factor which degrades the relationship is the separate and distinct personnel system that governs and provides a source of conflict for both groups.

Markessini, Lucas and Chandler (1994), conducted research to improve the development of senior and strategic leaders in the Army. They found that seventy-four percent of participants cited problems with the interface between uniformed and civilian executive leaders. However, there was a lack of consensus on the role of education and training as a means to address this problem. The study

participants felt that there was a need to improve the relationships between military and civilian leaders, as noted by 20 of the 27 respondents (all senior executive civilian service members).

One civilian participant in the study stated that "When we go to pick Colonel program managers, we cannot find any who are competent. It is a desperate situation." (Broedling, 1979, p. 51). Another participant viewed the problems of the military-civilian interface as insoluble, stating:

> I have come to believe that military officers simply do not care about civilians. While they are stationed here, they are out to get whatever they can from the civilians, whatever provides them with the best image and career possibilities. No training will change that. (Broedling, 1979, p. 51)

The study findings showed that the jobs of many in the Army's executive and senior executive services are difficult and this difficulty is enhanced by an inequitable distribution of the educational and developmental benefits that would enhance their capabilities and thus facilitate performance.

These research efforts show that differences between the two groups do exist. One difference noted by the research is the civilian tendency to build a consensus and avoid risk taking. As noted, these differences can be attributed to many factors: experience, education, personnel and reward systems and cultural influences. Although these differences may be known by members of both groups,

more may need to be done to improve the relationship between the groups in order to successfully implement integrated product teams.

G. SUMMARY

In summary, the commercial sector has found success with the implementation of Total Quality Management and Integrated Product Teams. Along with the use of the team management concept, commercial organizations have discovered that the incorporation and acceptance of different cultures into the team management strategy benefits the organization.

The Department of Defense has also adopted a Total Quality Management philosophy and the Integrated Product Team concept. As the commercial sector has done, the Department of Defense must incorporate all of its "cultures," including military officers and civilian employees. If the Department of Defense is committed to IPTs and Total Quality Management, it must acknowledge the factors that have contributed to the success experienced by commercial companies. Furthermore, it must incorporate those factors into the team philosophy it will put into place. A major factor of the demonstrated commercial success is the incorporation of different cultures into the team. In order to best utilize the resources available to it, each organization must recognize and work with the groups that will make up its integrated product teams.

Successful teams are comprised of team members who can work together towards a common goal. In order to facilitate the interaction of the group, the group must have good interpersonal skills and recognize that all members of the team have something to contribute. Group interaction and communication may not be as effective if conflict exists in the group and may cause an individual to experience frustration, strain and uneasiness in the group causing the group to work less effectively. Conflict can be reduced by numerous methods, including increased interpersonal contact between the groups, institutional and legislative change (e.g., equal employment laws) and conflict resolution.

Research completed to date states that there are differences between the military and civilian cultures, and, at times, these cultures clash. Successful team efforts employed by the commercial sector recognize and work with the differences that exist. Although many military officers and civilian employees realize that there are differences between the two groups, little has been done to ensure these differences do not interfere with the relationship between the two groups and that these two groups work well together. Successful groups that depend on shared purpose, free and open communication and empowerment need to recognize and use all team members. As stated in existing research, conflict may result if group members do not have mutual respect for each other, and this conflict must be openly and constructively managed.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH

This thesis explores how military and civilian relationships impact Integrated Product Teams, now that the Acquisition community has been directed to use teams to facilitate the acquisition process. It also investigates how experienced IPT participants view the relationship between the two groups and what affect differences between the groups may have on teams.

B. GENERAL RESEARCH STRATEGY

A comprehensive review of open literature on teaming and the affect of cultural differences on teams was conducted. In addition, Department of Defense information resources were studied to learn of existing research regarding civilian and military relationships.

This literature review was followed by telephonic and face-to-face interviews with Integrated Product Team participants. In this study, team members included service members and civilians who have participated in or managed IPTs.

Questions used during the interviews were designed to solicit responses which would answer the primary and subsidiary research questions presented in Chapter I. All interviews were recorded on audio tape, then transcribed and complied into cumulative response lists which allowed the data to be categorized and analyzed.

C. CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH

1. Interview Participants

Participants were solicited based on their experience with Integrated Product Teams. Military and civilian employees who have worked on IPTs or managed IPTs were used as interview subjects. These IPT participants work in various levels of the Defense Department, including Department of the Army Staff employees, Army Program Executive Office employees and Army Program Management employees. Interview subjects range from civilian grade GS 13 to SES and military officer rank 03 to 08. In addition to interviewing employees with experience on IPTs, the researcher wanted to ensure that a cross-section of interviews was conducted to minimize bias. To support this, the researcher interviewed eleven civilians and twelve service members from twenty Department of Defense organizations.

2. Collecting the Data

The critical incident interview technique was used to gather data to support this research. Flanagan (1954) describes the technique as a procedure to collect data regarding direct observations of human behavior and using the collected data to solve particular problems. In order to collect the required data, the interview subject is asked to relate observed specific behaviors, called incidents. The author states that "the use of the critical incident technique, rather than simply collecting opinions, hunches and estimates, provides a record of specific behaviors from

those in the best position to make evaluations." (Flanagan, (1954, p. 17) The incidents described are then used to gather important facts concerning behavior in defined situations. This technique was chosen based on the potentially sensitive subject matter discussed in this research and the desire to avoid a simple collection of opinions.

Interviews with participants were conducted to gather data describing specific instances that illustrate the military-civilian relationship and how that relationship impacts the functioning of the IPT. The following interview questions were used in both the face-to-face and telephonic interviews. The questions presented to the interview subjects were designed to collect data pertaining to the participants' experience on an Integrated Product Team, what interactions they witnessed between the groups and the biases and stereotypes which may effect how the two groups work together.

1. **Describe a time when anIntegrated Product (or process) team, composed of military and civilian members, worked well.**

    - How would you describe the relationship and interaction between group members?
    - What roles did group members assume? Did civilian and military members assume different/similar roles?
    - Did the group receive training on IPTs? Did this training help foster group effectiveness? If training was not provided, would training have helped the group?
    - How was team leadership addressed by the group? Was a leader assigned by management or did the group pick its own leader?

- Did other individuals assume leadership roles - regardless of an assigned leader? What impact did the leader have on team effectiveness, particularly military-civilian interactions?

- Did the Chain of Command have an impact on the team's effectiveness?

- Did the two groups have mutual respect towards each other? Did the groups listen and discuss viewpoints of all team members? How did the group evolve over time?

- If conflict arose, how was it managed by the group? How were rough spots overcome? Were there particular types of conflicts that reflected particular perspectives unique to military and civilian members of the team?

- Were there differences in work styles that could be attributed to differences in how military and civilian members viewed the work of the team? Appropriate processes? Level of effort? Team processes?

2. **Describe a time when military/civilian IPT did not work well together.**

- What were the interactions of the team members?

- Was conflict a factor in the lack of success in the group? What characterized the conflict with others? What specific issues could be attributed to a military versus civilian perspective? Was the conflict overcome? If so, how?

- Did the members show respect towards each other? Could a lack of respect have contributed towards the poor working relationship?

- What are the nature of biases that individuals have towards the other group that may interfere with team effectiveness? Could individual biases towards the "other" group members have contributed towards the lack of team success?

- Could assumptions/biases of the group members had a negative impact on team effectiveness?
- How did management influence the group interaction?
- What other factors (outside of those already discussed) contributed to the group not working well.

3. **Biases and stereotypes towards the other group.**

- What biases exist that could affect how military and civilian IPTs function?
- What do military officers (or civilian employees) see as the cultural differences between the two groups? Do these differences impact team success?
- Do stereotypes exist that inhibit team success?
- Can you share any experiences that display the existence of biases and stereotypes?

a) How Interviews Were Conducted ?

For all interviews, the list of interview questions was provided to the interview subject well in advance of the scheduled interview. Before conducting the interview, interview subjects were informed of the purpose of the interview and advised that no individual would be identified in the thesis. The author determined that anonymous interviews would result in a more candid disclosure of information on this potentially sensitive subject. This condition of anonymity was reinforced during the interview session by informing the interview subject that no participant would be identified in the research. Voice recording of the interviews allowed greater accuracy and interpretation of the responses and expedited the

interview process. The use of a recorder also enabled the researcher to keep the interview in focus and ensure each session was a valuable use of the interview subject's time. Interviews took between one to two and one-half hours to conduct, averaging one and one half hours.

The researcher maintained a separate response form for each interview which included all required administrative information (name, organization, e-mail address, date of interview, etc.) on interview subjects. All administrative forms were cross-referenced to the corresponding audio tape, transcript, and notes of the interview.

b) Analyzing the Findings

Upon completion of interviews, the researcher transcribed the data captured into written text and consolidated the data into a main interview sheet to categorize the type of interview (military, civilian, team member, leader or manager). This enabled further analysis of the data gathered from the interviews. The interviews were then sorted into military and civilian responses according to the issues addressed. These groups were then subcategorized into the following areas:

- Military biases and stereotypes towards civilians
- Military opinions on civilian stereotypes towards service members
- Civilian biases and stereotypes towards service members

- Civilian opinions on service member stereotypes towards civilians

Once the interview responses were categorized, major themes identified by the critical incidents or elaborated discussion were noted and are included in the analysis section.

IV. RESEARCH DATA PRESENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents data gathered through interviews with Acquisition Corps personnel who have participated in IPTs. Twelve service members and eleven civilians were interviewed for this research. The people interviewed are not identified by name or professional association for the sake of anonymity.

Section B of this chapter identifies service members' concerns regarding the working relationship with civilians. Section C chapter discusses DoD civilians' opinions regarding how service members feel about them. Section D identifies DoD civilian issues concerning the working relationship with service members. Section E addresses service member opinions regarding how DoD civilians feel about them. Unless indicated in the data presented below, issues identified in sections B, C, D and E address topics which were discussed by a majority of the people interviewed. Section F discusses the effect of bias and conflict on team performance. Section G summarizes this chapter. Analysis of the interviews is presented in Chapter 5.

B. SERVICE MEMBERS' ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH DOD CIVILIANS

1. Continuity of Civilians

All military interviewees felt that the civilian workforce provides the organization with continuity which assists the acquisition corps officer by providing them with technical and functional knowledge that the service member would not usually have. This expertise helps to educate service members about the DoD acquisition process. The longevity of the civilian workforce helped one interviewee to "solve problems that he did not know how to fix."

Despite the continuity that the civilian gives to the service member, military interviewees stated that the long term employment of civilians makes them less likely to take risks. Any risks taken by a civilian could cause future negative repercussions for that civilian employee, while the service member who directed the action will not face those repercussions, but may reap the short term benefit. The possibility of failure and retribution is greater for the civilian who will remain in the organization after the service member has taken a new assignment.

Regarding continuity, one interviewee stated that professional relationships that develop between civilians in the organization, due to their geographical stability and longevity can both help and hurt the organization. Specifically:

> The continuity provided by civilians may cause in-breeding...you sit around a table at a meeting and discover that one guy at the table is the brother-in-law of another guy who is the neighbor of the first guy. A "green suiter" (Army officer) must recognize that before he

> storms in and shoots and then realizes he screwed up. I did not recognize this relationship at first and expected people to do certain things that were impossible given the relationship that existed. This may complicate the business relationship and personality comes into play more than you would care to see.

In contrast, these professional relationships, at times, aided many of the military interviewees. The same interview subject stated that:

> [I]n many instances a problem looked unsolveable, and a civilian would pipe up, "I know so and so who I'll call to get the problem fixed" - And the problem would get fixed a lot quicker than if we had to use the chain of command...

Interviewees shared another aspect of civilian continuity: the parochial nature exhibited by civilians protecting their own domain in the organization. This is often referred to as a "rice-bowl" mentality - i.e., people look out for their own "rice bowls". Service members interviewed feel that civilians will look out for their own interests, despite what is needed by the organization because their job or reputation may depend on their action or inaction. This self-serving mentality and the closed mind that service members associate with it is a source of frustration to military personnel. The result of this self-serving mentality is that progress of the organization is affected. For example:

> We had to re-organize the division, but a civilian on the team refused to cooperate or participate because he knew his power base would go away if the group accomplished what it had set out to do. His boss had put him on the team because he knew [the team member] would be obstinate. The boss's power would be eroded as well, so he [the boss] did not want the team to accomplish anything. The team member reported back to the boss on what the team was doing - or

> not doing, thanks to him. He continually threw up road blocks to any progress that the team made or was trying to make.

Finally, interviewees stated that the lack of civilian rotation allowed certain civilian employees to wait out a service member. If the civilian employee was not motivated to support the service member, the eventual departure of that service member might encourage the employee to simply wait until the service member departed the organization and not perform the required task.

2. Motivation of Civilians

A major topic discussed by service members (eighty-three percent of interviewees) was motivation of civilian employees. The prime motivator for civilians was seen as money.

> Civilians are only motivated by a paycheck. The innovators and motivators have risen to the top. Those that are left behind are motivated only by money.

Another interviewee expressed that his fellow officers feel:

> ...Civilians are less [dedicated] than military since they are being bribed...performance appraisals alone do not motivate civilians...dollars motivate civilians.

All interview subjects stated that the most difficult adjustment they had to make while working on an IPT or in a civilian organization was that they were dealing with civilians and had to motivate civilian employees differently than military. Ten military officers stated that they learned they could not just order

their employees to act and had to learn new ways to motivate people. One military officer summed up this issue succinctly:

> There are two attitudes that military officers have towards civilians. One is the arrogant military, that civilians are wimps. The other is the collegial military that recognize we are all on the same team although the civilian wears a different suit. Some military are not problem solvers but accusers. A military officer must understand the civilian culture and work with it or he will never succeed.

Another interviewee expressed the same feelings in this interview:

> The military must work with civilians or they will fail. They cannot antagonize the workforce. They must make friends. They [the military] cannot order a civilian to do anything but must motivate them. They must develop a relationship.

This opinion was reinforced by a third interviewee who stated:

> ...when military has the attitude "I'm in charge," he will fail. When he takes the attitude "I can learn from civilians who have worked in the job," he will succeed. An attitude of I'm here to learn, you're here to teach me, or a mentor-protégé relationship, will serve an officer well.

All service members expressed that they had to make significant adjustments to the civilian work environment. They needed to use different motivational techniques to get people to work together as a team. Instead of ordering people as they had in the past, they needed to encourage and motivate people to do what they wanted. One interviewee noted the actions of two Majors who reported to him:

> I watched these two arrogant Majors come in and approach civilians with their [the military] noses up in the air. I took them aside and told them they would not get anything accomplished like this. They

> needed to approach these people as a part of the team. We [the program management office] had to get the test site cleaned up. At first, they went in and said "It is your job and you will do it," which got them nowhere. They went back again and said, "Hey guys, we have this problem, and we need your help. We [the Majors] can contribute these resources, do you guys think you can help?" This approach got the assistance that they needed.

Unlike military officers who may be motivated by the opportunity for training, interview subjects did not see training as a motivator for civilians. Job requirements, the lack of another person to perform the job in the trainee's absence and personal hardships were identified as factors discouraging civilian employees from attending training for any length of time.

In contrast, military personnel cited pride in work performed as a motivator for many civilians. Many interviewees (sixty-six percent) cited that civilian employees were motivated by the work required by military operations such as Desert Storm. To emphasize this point, an interviewee referred to a statement made by a retiring Command Sergeant Major of the Army:

> I had never realized how dedicated civilians were. I never worked with civilians before...and didn't think much of them...didn't know much about civilians. Now I have a better appreciation for the work these people do...I appreciate the hard work and dedication that these people put forth.

While this new environment forced the individuals to adjust their management style from ordering to motivating, they all felt that the adjustment

was beneficial to their professional development, as illustrated by the following example:

> Working in a civilian organization gave me exposure to things I never would have seen otherwise. I met people in civil service careers that I never would have been exposed to otherwise...people with physical handicaps, that overcame those challenges to perform rewarding work...I never would have seen this anyplace else.

3. Leadership

While a civilian work environment may have required an adjustment for service members, seventy-five percent of interview subjects stated military officers make better leaders than their civilian counterparts. These military interviewees based this ability on leadership training provided to the military which is not provided to the civilian workforce. One interviewee stated:

> The military has better leadership abilities over civilians, even at the senior levels. The leadership aspect is emphasized in [military] training. Civilians may be smart managers, but not leaders. A leader looks out for his employees. A leader will visit his employees in the hospital. A civilian manager may not even know where the hospital is. A military officer and his wife will not only know where the hospital is but will visit often. A military leader must worry about the family members that a [military] guy leaves behind and if the service members can pay their bills. Service to employees has a close link to leadership.

This interview subject felt that good civilian leaders were lacking in DoD acquisition.

Another leadership trait mentioned by all military officers is the career guidance provided by service members to their military peers and subordinates.

Members of the military serve as mentor to other officers, providing informal job and training advice. The counseling aspect of leadership was shared:

> When I was enlisted, I was considering my career options. I went into the chief's office and showed him the re-enlistment letter I had received. He stated that he felt I would make a good officer, and explained the educational benefits that the Army offered. If I hadn't spoken to him, I doubt that I would ever have gone to college.

The same interview subject shared the following about the counseling he performs:

> I frequently talk to officers about the professional and educational benefits in their future, and we discuss the best options. I spoke to an officer just the other day, via e-mail, about an educational opportunity that was going to be presented to him and we discussed the best course of action for him. I don't have civilians coming in my office and asking for advice. I don't have similar discussions with civilians.

The caring and coaching demonstrated by this interviewee is one trait of good leadership which should be provided to members of the organization. Not only does this build employee loyalty to the leader and the organization, it also demonstrates to others in the organization that this (military) leader cares about the employees' future.

4. Time

All military subjects raised the issue of time and feel that many civilians are clock watchers which impedes progress and accomplishments of the organization. Interviewees stated that many civilians were concerned about the clock, coming in

exactly on time, getting the right amount of time for lunch and leaving exactly on time. One interview subject stated:

> ...Some civilians (but not all) do not care if my hair is on fire, they are going to leave at 1600 hours. It doesn't matter what needs to get done, they are walking out the door. I can order an officer to stay, but I cannot make a civilian stay past quitting time...

All interview subjects expressed frustration over regulations that address civilian travel on personal time. Civilians cannot be forced to travel on personal time but service members can be directed to travel after normal duty hours. These interviewees expressed annoyance that civilian employees can request compensation for travel time outside of normal duty hours, while a military officer cannot. One officer stated:

> [T]his is what separates the loyal civilians from the ones that are not dedicated. Those that refuse to travel on their own time, travel on Thursday [after hours] and don't come to work on a Friday, saying they traveled on their own time. This separates the good, dedicated employees from the bad.

However, one interviewee stated that differences between military and civilian attitudes toward work time tend to dissipate once an individual works in the Washington D.C. headquarters environment.

> Once you get to the Pentagon, you see both military and civilian watch the clock, if they are in a carpool. Suddenly, it doesn't matter what is going on, if their carpool is leaving, they have to go. But once they are out of that environment, they [the military] don't focus on the clock as much but the civilian will work to the clock.

The issue of time and the different rules which apply to military and civilian employees appear to be a contentious and volatile issue based on the intensity and lengthy discourse used by military interviewees to address the issue.

Another aspect of time, as it relates to deadlines, was discussed by another service member. He stated that civilians frustrate him because they do not accomplish assignments within an acceptable time period. This military interviewee stated that civilians are too slow to complete assignments and expressed frustration that civilians frequently question various aspects of an assignment (e.g., why an assignment is required, the correct mechanism to complete an assignment).

> A civilian will ask, "Why?" and a military will not only jump but ask, "How high?" The civilian works in a more deliberate fashion, whereas the military wants closure...due to the fact that civilians have time to work the issue.

The same interviewee stated that military officers complete an assignment in a more timely manner.

Another interviewee emphasized this point. His experience with civilians showed that "civilians were not as concerned about deadlines". This officer's team experience showed him that civilians have difficulty keeping to a timetable; while military team members focus on task completion.

C. WHAT DO SERVICE MEMBERS THINK OF US (CIVILIANS)?

Most civilians interviewed (ninety-one percent) predicted that military officers would describe civilians as clock watchers. They noted that service members were surprised when their civilian counterparts worked as many (or possibly more) hours than service members. These civilians stated that the military think that service members work more hours daily since they are on a 24 hour work clock. One civilian countered this perception noting that, although the two groups may put in the same number of hours, service members are entitled to physical training time, which takes them away from the office for one to one and one-half hours daily. Based on the use of this time for physical training, civilians stated that they work an equal numbers of hours. Another interview subject stated that in his recent experience, civilian employees put in more hours than their military counterparts.

One civilian saw the time demands of work to be an inherent feature of the acquisition environment that affected both military and civilians equally.

> Military may put in more hours [than civilians] in the acquisition environment simply based on the nature of the jobs that the military hold...[I]n a program manager's office... a civilian in a similar position, will put in as many hours...[I]t is the nature of the job.

All interviewees stated that most service members view civilians as functional experts. Although this may not be recognized by the military officer

immediately, once it is recognized, they depend on civilian employees as a subject matter expert in acquisition procedures and technical matters.

Civilians state that the military do not sufficiently appreciate the role civilians play in providing continuity to the organization. The experience that civilians have in one organization may mean that past mistakes are not repeated and work may be performed more effectively. On the same subject, however, one civilian employee stated that the continuity provided by civilians may not be viewed positively by the military. Civilian continuity may be seen as an unwillingness to move geographically:

> The military may view civilians as squatters... some civilians complain about separation due to travel or training, while these guys [military officers] experience longer separations from their families under much more difficult conditions...The military may view civilians as whiners and complainers because of this.

Another opinion frequently expressed was that service members may be jealous of civilians. The military may think that civilians have it easier than service members, have made fewer sacrifices but get better pay and benefits.

D. DOD CIVILIAN ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY

1. Rotation and Equity of Career Opportunities

The rotation of service members through an organization was discussed by all civilians interviewed. Military rotation is seen to present both positive and negative consequences for the organization and its employees. Interview subjects unanimously agreed that military officers should stay in a position for at least a major acquisition milestone review, if not longer. One interview subject stated the following:

> A Project/Program manager [e.g., military officer] should stay around to reap the rewards of work - good or bad - [the individual] should be there long enough to deal with issues they generate. If they commit to an acquisition strategy, they ought to be there to work it through to its conclusion and not leave the battlefield damage for the rest of us to clean up.

This individual was not alone in thinking that service members should stay in place longer. All participants stated that military officers should stay in place longer than the current average of two to three years.

Out of the eleven civilians interviewed, eight stated that the constant rotation of service members did not contribute to the strategic vision of the organization. The temporary assignment of the military officer in charge causes an organization to emphasize a short term strategy over a long term strategy, focusing only on those tangible successes achievable while in the position.

Based on interviews conducted, continuous military rotation creates some resentment on the part of civilian employees in the Acquisition community. Three of the eleven civilian interview subjects stated that they often tired of training the officers that come through their organizations, knowing that those officers would leave in two to three years. It was also stated that service members receive better assignments and are provided more meaningful career experience and exposure to senior level personnel. In one instance, a civilian stated that jobs have been created to provide a military officer with visibility and responsibility to enhance that person's career, but deserving civilians are not given the same opportunity:

> The military career path requires visibility. Positions will be created to provide an officer with the visibility and responsibility that they [the officer] requires. A deserving civilian will be in the field for years with little visibility, and be more deserving, but will not get the same opportunities. The military gets more recognition and better jobs. I watched one [military] come into the organization and get the position simply because he needed the experience - not because he had any expertise.

Ninety-one percent of civilians interviewed expressed frustration with the inequality with the promotion and education of service members versus civilian employees. They stated that promotions and training opportunities (e.g., advanced schooling) are more automatic for service members and that an officer's career is almost guided for them. One interviewee stated the following:

> I find it somewhat disturbing to note that Congress wants to see equality between military and civilian in Program Management and

> then you open up the January/February 1997 issue of *Army Research, Development and Acquisition* magazine and you see almost no civilians in the photographs.

Many interviewees added, however, that promotions have become much more difficult for service members in the recent past.

A related issue raised by all interviewees was that, although military rotation creates difficulties for an organization, more military should rotate through Acquisition organizations. They feel this is good for both military and civilian employees. Military employees gain valuable experience from exposure to a civilian organization, at a junior level in their career, in advance of taking charge of a civilian organization. Many military officers that take charge of a primarily civilian organization without prior exposure to that type of organization are at a disadvantage.

The rotation of service personnel was seen as having some benefit to civilians as well. All interviewees stated that, as a result of the rate of rotation, civilian employees benefit from increased exposure to their military counterparts and may be less likely to stereotype service members as they have more exposure to officers. As stated by one civilian:

> ...more exposure [to military] for civilians would help...The current lack of exposure and understanding of the military [by civilians] provide little appreciation of the military culture....

Service members also bring a fresh perspective into an organization. Along with this new viewpoint, the military officer provides the perspective of the equipment user. This user insight is a perspective that a civilian rarely, if ever, possesses. All interview subjects agreed that despite the negative aspects of rotation, the service member brings a knowledge of the battlefield, the needs of the equipment user and provides a military perspective that is crucial to the acquisition process.

2. Military Evaluation System

Another topic frequently discussed by interview subjects (ninety-one percent) was the strong focus of the military on their performance evaluations. Ten of the eleven civilians interviewed felt the focus on military evaluations is detrimental to the organization. The perception is that this emphasis on performance evaluations, at times, causes military personnel to concentrate on issues that will only have a positive effect on their evaluation:

> I've seen instances where service members refused to do a job - a job they knew was important - because it would have a negative effect on their evaluation. A major stated "wait a second guys, you realize if I do this, that I may get a poor rating because Lieutenant Colonel "Smith" [his rater] has not told me to do what you are asking. Yes, I realize it is important, but I live and die by my rating." What he was being asked to do was vital to the program's success but he refused because his rater may give him a poor review - it didn't matter what was important to the program or the guy in the field.

The result may be a focus on issues that may not be important to the organization or beneficial to the acquisition process.

In order to receive a favorable performance appraisal, it was felt that some military officers were unable to delegate duties and had to manage every task, since their careers depend on what is written in the performance report. Since service members' career success is dependent on their rating, they will not rely on civilian technical expertise to solve critical problems. These same officers, however will use the civilian technical experts for administrative and clerical functions until they have "worn them out and ruined the morale of the organization," which can have disastrous consequences for the organizations. An example illustrates:

> A Colonel can be very interested in issues that are not important to the grand scheme of things - interested in all flash and no substance and loses credibility with the work force and never recovers. A Colonel looking to get promoted to General Officer is especially dangerous. This type of officer uses civilians as rocket fuel to get into BG [Brigadier General] orbit.

While service members may show a strong focus on their performance evaluations, a civilian interviewee stated that military performance measures that are used do not ensure that DoD acquisition needs are being met:

> Military performance reports focus too much on vague system cost, schedule and performance factors and do not address specific accomplishments in the program. The program may be in bad shape but the [officer's] performance report will still be favorable.

Most civilians understand the reason behind the military focus on the evaluation since it is the primary basis for retention and promotion. The same civilians also

stated that this focus may not be beneficial to the organization since the efforts that result in a favorable rating may not be the same elements that will benefit the acquisition program.

3. Military Adjustment from Management of an Operational Environment to a Business Organization

All interviewees agreed that many military members must adjust to a civilian environment. Many interview subjects referred to the acquisition environment as a "business environment," and stated that it differs from a military environment since the acquisition of weapon systems depends heavily on business decisions, unlike a military operational environment.

A service member may adjust their management style to fit this civilian dominated organization. The military leader who assumes that a civilian organization can be run like an military unit may not succeed. A military leader who wants to succeed in a business organization might learn from the following:

> In a civilian organization, people don't kill themselves for you because you are the figurehead boss. People kill themselves for you because they admire you and want to go where you want to take them.

Another civilian interview subject went on to share what he witnessed when an officer came into a business environment and how that officer adjusted his leadership style:

> When this Colonel came into a civilian organization, initially he tried to run it like a military organization, and realized that it wouldn't work. Once he came to grips with the fact that he was in a

> business organization and people reacted better to a business approach and not a military approach, he got much more respect from everybody and got a lot more done. Once he realized that he was managing a small number of civilians (not 300 - 400 people) and a LOT of money, he did a great job.

Once this individual realized that he was working with a group of professionals who knew what needed to be done on a day-to-day basis, he trusted his employees with the daily operation of the organization and gave them the authority they needed to perform. He also recognized that his employees needed him to provide direction and vision; he gave the employees the leadership they needed.

In another instance, the same interview subject addressed the opposite type of personality who:

> ...was unable to trust and delegate to civilians and unable to prioritize. This micro-management style meant everything was late and the important work was not getting accomplished. He gave orders to civilians and it never worked....

For both service members described above, it was their first time dealing with and managing a civilian work force.

4. Military Culture

Five of the eleven civilian interview subjects stated that the military culture and wearing of a uniform make entry into the military clique easier which may facilitate communication. These interviewees stated this occurs due to the easy identification (via the uniform) of the service member's rank, branch, achievements and awards. These five civilians felt frustrated by the inherent respect and deferential treatment that military officers expect and receive. One interview subject noted that service members are automatically addressed by military rank (by military and civilian employees) while civilians are, almost always, referred to by their first names. This occurs even when a title may be appropriate for a civilian due to the individual's position in the organization or a degree received. This casual (civilian) versus formal (military) form of address occurs in different situations: during casual conversation, formal meetings and conferences and in written correspondence:

> A civilian is always addressed by their first name. I see junior officers do this constantly, even with a Senior Executive Service employee [military equivalent is a General Officer] when the same individual would never dream of calling a General Officer by their first name. On a conference agenda, military names always have a title attached whereas the civilian is referred to by first and last name, not even with a Mr. or Ms.

Another interview subject added that the military gives its members an immediate fraternal bond and that the fraternal nature of the organization gives its

members many "privileges" that civilians envy. One aspect is the mentor-protégé relationship which develops between junior and senior officers. This relationship takes place both during and after duty hours (on a professional and personal basis) and may continue throughout the officers' careers. The formation of this type of mentor-protégé relationship provides professional contacts and opportunities that may not have occurred without the relationship.

One interview subject stated that the military may look down on civilians (perhaps due to lack of a visible rank) until the service member can figure out where the civilian fits in the organization and what the civilian member can or cannot do to support the service member's interests.

> Many times a military officer will ignore me in a meeting or conversation, and then they figure out what job I fill, that I can hurt or help their program in terms of resources. Suddenly they get very friendly and treat me as a peer instead of assuming they can ignore me.

While most civilian interview subjects agreed that respect is given to a service member automatically, a small number (thirty-six percent) stated that the officer must earn respect after the initial impression. Three interview subjects added that, while the uniform and rank of the military give service members automatic credibility, it could cause the military to be stereotyped as having a specific personality type ("aggressive, rigid, conservative") or leadership style ("I

order, you obey"). Interviewees stated that these stereotypes were not always deserved.

Three civilians stated that while the military were given privileges based on rank but they added that many civilians do not appreciate or understand the military culture. To illustrate, one stated:

> Civilians have little appreciation of military culture...little awareness of who the customer is... civilians at times put down military. In an operational environment, a Colonel is God, has many people reporting to him that he directs. In a civilian environment, people don't appreciate that fact and, at times, do not show the military the respect that they deserve based on their rank. A Colonel in a military organization has hundreds of people at his beck and call. In a civilian organization he is lucky if he has twenty people that report directly to him.

E. WHAT DO CIVILIANS THINK OF US (THE MILITARY)?

When asked what stereotypes and biases civilians have regarding the military, all Military interviewees stated that civilians relied on them for their knowledge of the operational environment of the service. Many stated that civilians had little knowledge of the battlefield. The service member's operational knowledge combined with the civilian continuity "makes the partnership a productive one." The interviewees felt battlefield knowledge provided by service members is invaluable to the acquisition environment.

Eighty-three percent of military interviewees stated that civilians may think that service members put too much emphasis on their evaluations. As one officer stated,

> We may put too much effort into getting that ticket punched [getting the right experience and exposure] but we have to because if we don't, we don't get promoted. This may cause us to look at only things that affect our appraisals and not what is good for the organization in the long run.

Seventy-five percent of military interviewees added that service members may not be aware of the impact of their changes to the organization.

These interview subjects stated that, in conjunction with the emphasis on military evaluation, the short tenure of service members in an organization may force the service member to "make changes for change sake." One interviewee stated that:

> [M]any civilians probably think that the Colonel goes off half cocked like a crazy man, that we have no idea what we're doing and have no experience with what we are trying to change. But they don't understand that we only have a short time to perform and get a good OER [Officer Evaluation Report]....

All interview subjects addressed the short tenure of service members, but not everyone stated that it was detrimental to an organization. It is viewed as a fact of life for the military.

F. AFFECT OF BIAS AND CONFLICT ON TEAM PERFORMANCE

As part of each interview, all subjects were asked what they felt the affect of biases and stereotypes were on the functioning of a team. Nine civilian and nine military interviewees stated that biases and stereotypes have not impacted team effectiveness. One military interview subject stated that "once the employee took the uniform or tie off, all people were seen as members of the team, as a "we not me" group."

Eighty-two percent of civilians interviewed stated that biases were set aside and if conflict existed, it was ignored. When asked if the military management style might cause conflict, a civilian stated that too little conflict may exist:

> The military inherently take charge, due to training and it could be a problem if you have a bunch of bashful civilians. If the military thinks he is an expert, he will not rely on the group.

All interviewees stated that civilians may be afraid of expressing their opinion when a service member is part of the team, which may be reinforced by the military management style. A military interviewee noted:

> The military environment may foster ordering a team to do something other than what they [the team] came up with. The military may have a tendency to take advantage of a higher position, more than civilians.

Perhaps signaling a change in the traditional command orientation of military officers, one civilian interviewee stated that he saw a new military leader emerging in the DoD acquisition community:

> I am seeing more General Officers that are easy to get along with, who empower the workforce as opposed to the type who give orders. The new generation of leaders are more attuned to business practices and the fact that their workforce is their strength.

Interviewees were asked if conflict that was evident on their team had an affect on the team and if the conflict was resolved. All interview subjects stated that while conflict existed between military and civilian team members, conflict did not impact the team's performance. The conflict was not addressed by the group; the team worked with the conflict and did not try to confront or eliminate it.

G. SUMMARY

Based on interviews conducted, service members expressed four major issues concerning their working relationship with DoD civilians. The following was shared by the military interviewees:

- Civilians work on a time clock and are not as dedicated as service members
- Continuity provided by civilians is both good and bad for the organization
- Money is the primary motivator for civilians
- Service Members are better leaders than civilians

Civilian interviewees shared what opinions service members might have about them. They felt that service members would state:

- Civilians are too concerned about the time clock
- Civilians provide continuity

- Civilians are the functional acquisition experts

Civilians interviewed expressed four major issues concerning their working relationship with service members.

- Military rotation has both positive and negative impact on an organization
- Military may place too much emphasis on their evaluations and may neglect the team project requirements
- Military must adjust their management style for the DoD civilian environment
- The military culture and the resulting different treatment of civilians and military

Military interviewees shared what opinions civilians might have about service members. Service members stated:

- Military provide knowledge of the operational environment which benefits the organization
- Service Members may place too much emphasis on their evaluations

Interview subjects were asked if biases and stereotypes exhibited by the two groups have an impact on team effectiveness. All interview subjects stated that biases have little or no effect on teams.

The responses shared by civilian and military interviewees are analyzed in Chapter V.

V. ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This analysis uses the philosophy, concepts, principles and theories expressed in the Literature Review Chapter to explain and evaluate the findings resulting from personal interviews. The analysis addresses themes noted in Chapter IV which were discussed by military and civilian interviewees. Within each theme are the applicable existing literature, summary of the interview results and the implications for IPTs. Themes are grouped by military and civilian interview results. Military interview themes are benefits and detriments of civilian continuity, civilian motivation, military leadership, and civilian preoccupation with time. Civilian interview themes are military rotation and career equity, military emphasis on evaluations, military management of a civilian organization, and the military culture. This chapter also addresses conflict as discussed in the literature, in interviews conducted for this research and the results for IPTs. The chapter concludes by addressing action implications for improving team effectiveness based on the analysis of results of the research.

B. SERVICE MEMBERS' ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH DOD CIVILIANS

1. Continuity of Civilians

a. Results of literature review

As described in Chapter II, Markessini (1994) found that civilians are more inclined than military personnel to build consensus and are less willing to take risks. Broedling's (1979) research noted that the intent of the civilian-military mix is that civilians provide continuity and corporate memory. Bridger (1994) states that the military requires civilian continuity for institutional knowledge. While he did not relate it specifically to civilian continuity, Bridger also states that officers assume that civilians are less responsive to service members; and Long (1977) concluded that civilians wait out the transfer of commanding officers to avoid doing things with which they disagree.

b. Results of research

Service members interviewed for this research cite positive and negative consequences of civilian continuity and reinforce aspects of the literature. Specifically, they cite that civilian continuity provides historical knowledge to an organization but noted negative impacts of civilian continuity; the parochial civilian viewpoint and civilian disregard of a service member's directive due to the eventual departure of the service member. Civilians validated military comments that civilians provide continuity and functional expertise.

Service members interviewed extended the existing literature by stating that civilian continuity provides innovative problem solving methods.

c. Implications for IPTs

The literature cites that an organization with indifferent and unaccepting attitudes towards out-group members will not benefit from the potential contributions of all members of the workforce (Bartunek, 1996; Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). If civilians view military as outsiders, soon to depart the organization, ignoring their suggestions or directives, the group does not benefit from military participation. A collective work product (Katzenbach and Smith, 1991) will not be achieved if the group members do not recognize the interests of others, which may result if civilians are self-serving.

2. Motivation of Civilians

a. Results of literature review

The literature states the military perceive that civilians must be motivated, and not ordered, to perform (Bridger, 1994). Woolley, et al (1986), state that the military concentrates on cash awards as a primary tool to motivate civilians, but other rewards may be equally effective. Training, however, while usually effective as a personnel motivator, may not motivate civilians since they see little relationship between training and promotions. This is in contrast to

service members who can see a direct link between the two (Woolley, et al., 1986 and Bridger, 1994).

b. Results of research

Confirming the existing literature, all service members interviewed stated that they had to motivate civilian employees differently than subordinate service members and, instead of ordering people, had to treat civilians as a fellow member of a team. While service members validated the existing literature, stating their perception that money is the primary motivator for civilians, they added that pride in work performed also motivates civilians.

Another area where service members reinforce the literature is in the area of training as a motivator. They perceive that training, which may motivate the military, may not motivate civilians. Service members note that the military see a direct link between training and promotions, civilians do not.

Military and civilian interviewees stated that service members and civilians work together successfully on teams despite the different military and civilian reward systems. The different reward systems were not viewed as a deterrent to team performance.

c. Implications for IPTs

Service members interviewed recognize that civilians should be treated as a valued part of the team, as stated by Katzenbach and Smith (1991). Katzenbach and Smith found that successful IPTs reward team performance, but if rewards given by team leaders do not motivate individuals to support IPT efforts (e.g., training may motivate military but may not motivate civilians), the desired team work product may not be realized. If other rewards are available to motivate team members (e.g., ceremonies, performance certificates), they should be used to recognize contribution to team performance. Although interviewees state that their IPTs were effective without team based awards, the literature asserts that team based awards motivate IPTs to produce a collective work product (Katzenbach and Smith, 1991).

3. Leadership

a. Results of literature review

Katzenbach and Smith (1991) state that good teams have shared leadership roles and should have a personal bond. Bridger (1994) states that civilians would rather work for an officer because the uniform signals leadership and the rank and file look for leadership. Skinner (1993), however, stated that Army leaders fail to provide effective leadership to Army civilians. Woolley, et

al. (1986) stated that the groups were critical of the other group's knowledge and experience supervising their group.

b. Results of research

Military statements that they are better leaders than civilians contradict Skinner's (1993) research which found that Army leaders fail to provide leadership to civilians. While service members confirm Bridger's (1994) literature which states that civilians look for leadership and find it via the military whose uniform signals leadership for civilians, civilians state that service members who use a stereotypical authoritative leadership style do not succeed in a civilian organization. However, service members interviewed commented that they were better leaders than civilians which confirms Woolley, et al.'s (1986) work which states that both groups are critical of the other group's knowledge and experience supervising their group.

Military interviewees state the high quality leadership they provide is demonstrated by the concern they show for their employees and the mentor-protégé relationship encouraged between military members. Although noted as a key ingredient for successful military leaders, this mentor-protégé relationship was not seen by any interviewee as a facet of the military-civilian relationship. Military interviewees stated that service members are more effective leaders than civilians, which may indicate that leadership roles are not shared between service

members and civilians, which Katzenbach and Smith (1993) cite as a main ingredient for effective teams. Although civilians noted different leadership approaches employed by service members that are successful (team management) and unsuccessful (authoritative leadership approach), civilians interviewed did not comment on the quality of military leadership compared to civilian leadership.

c. Implications for IPTs

Leadership provided by service members may foster better teams. Service members state their actions demonstrate that they care about their team members which Jehn (1995) states may reduce team friction, resulting in a more effective team. The effective military leadership traits noted by military interviewees (mentor-protégé, care of subordinates) may ensure minority (civilian) group acceptance (Cox, 1991) which may reduce conflict and bias. However, these effective leadership traits mentioned by service members will foster good team relationships only if provided to all team members. If a mentor-protégé relationship is extended to only the military team members, excluding minority (civilian) members, group friction may increase. If service members (and civilians) provide leadership to each other, cooperation among IPT members may increase.

4. Time

a. Results of literature review

Bridger (1994) states that civilian use of compensatory time, overtime and quitting time frustrate service members who are required to stay until an assignment is complete. Long (1977) stated that civilians are not willing to work more that 40 hours per week in order to do a good job. Woolley, et al. (1986) confirm that a source of irritation (for the military) is that the military "has to stay, you guys (civilians) get to go home (at 5:30)."

b. Results of research

All military interviewees agreed that civilians are clock watchers, confirming the existing literature. Service members are frustrated by systemic differences such as travel regulations that force military to travel on their own time, without additional compensation, but compensate civilians who travel on their own time. They claim that civilians do not accomplish assignments in an acceptable timeframe and are not as concerned about deadlines. Civilian interviews confirmed that service members view civilians as clock watchers.

c. Implications for IPTs

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) note that the essence of a team is common commitment. Without common commitment, groups do not perform as teams but as individuals; with common commitment, individuals collectively

perform toward a common goal or work product. If military members of an IPT feel that civilians are not as dedicated as the military team members, friction may develop and the team may lose its collective drive.

The literature states that strong teams need to develop a common approach, determine how work will be accomplished and how schedules will be set and adhered to (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Jehn 1995). The different military and civilian views regarding time may hinder these actions and introduce unhelpful conflict in the team. An IPT leader should ensure the group has a common approach to carry out the group's goals.

C. DOD CIVILIAN ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY

1. Rotation and Equity of Career Opportunities

a. Results of literature review

The literature noted that civilians state inequities exist between the two groups. Markessini, Lucas and Chandler (1994) state that distribution of educational benefits is not equal between the groups. Apple's (1973) thesis stated that two distinct career services and the different personnel systems that support the groups provide a source of conflict for the groups.

Young's (1985) research notes that another difference between the two groups is the transient nature of the military. Broedling (1979) found that military rotation provides new suggestions as well as knowledge about fleet needs.

As noted in existing research, the following are all potential sources of conflict: experience, education, personnel and reward systems and cultural influences.

b. Results of research

Civilians interviewed state that inequities do exist in the promotion and education of the two groups. They perceive that service members receive better assignments and more exposure to senior level personnel which may enhance the service member's career and noted that the same opportunities were not provided to them.

With the exception of Broedling (1979), who noted the positive aspects of military rotation, existing literature does not address military rotation as a detriment to an organization but merely as a difference between the two groups. In contrast, civilians interviewed for this research state that military rotation has positive and negative consequences for an organization. Confirming Broedling's results, civilians state that the positive aspects of rotation are that service members provide organizational knowledge of the battlefield, the needs of the equipment user and a military perspective that is crucial to the acquisition process. Both groups benefit from increased exposure since, as a result, civilians are less likely to stereotype the military and may care more about the welfare of service members. Service members interviewed agree that they provide knowledge of the operational environment which benefits the IPT but did not cite any negative

aspects of military rotation. On the negative side, civilians in this study stated that military rotation does not contribute to the strategic, long term vision of the organization and burdens the organization due to the increased training required to support a continuous influx of service members.

c. Implications for IPTs

Despite the negative aspects of military rotation, it does provide the cross functional expertise that Kaminski (1995) asserts is necessary to maximize IPT performance. Milliken (1996) states that diverse groups relate better to their customers; military rotation through an organization provides IPT diversity and a relationship with the equipment user. In addition, Messick and Mackie (1991) cite that increased interpersonal contact may improve intergroup relations. Most civilians interviewed felt that increased contact between the groups is good for IPTs.

Civilian team members may view a service member as someone who cannot, due to their limited tenure in the organization, contribute to the long range view of the organization. The military focus on the short term, versus the civilian focus on long term outcomes, may result in a team with competing work priorities, which could ultimately lead to conflict among team members. This implies that it is important for IPTs to acknowledge the different outcomes desired by each team

member and ensure that they are met by the team without undermining the goals of the group.

In addition, perceived career inequities have potential for negative consequences for IPTs. Katzenbach and Smith (1991) state in well functioning teams, members provide support to other team members, focusing on collective work products. Civilian team members' perceptions that military receive a greater benefit from the team's effort (i.e., better assignments and more exposure to senior level personnel, enhancing the service members' career) could result in lack of support to team goals. Perceptions of inequity of rewards for team performance contradicts the recommendations in the literature for team based rewards and could be a source of conflict and reduced team effectiveness in producing collective work products.

2. Military Evaluation System

a. Results of literature review

Literature reviewed in Chapter II does not discuss military emphasis on performance evaluations and its effect on the military-civilian relationship.

b. Results of research

Although not addressed in existing literature, civilians interviewed perceive that the strong military focus on performance evaluations is detrimental to IPTs and the acquisition process. Interviewees stated that the military's reliance

on their performance appraisal resulted in behaviors that hindered team efficiency and effectiveness due to:

- an unwillingness to delegate
- lack of reliance on civilian technical experts
- emphasis on short term measures not long term results required for IPT success

Service members confirmed civilian statements regarding military emphasis on performance evaluations and its affect on IPT functioning, but did not state it was detrimental to IPT performance.

c. Implications for IPTs

Katzenbach and Smith (1991) state that effective teams recognize the interests and achievements of others, give others the benefit of the doubt, and have collective work products. If service members focus only on those areas that will benefit their individual performance appraisal, team collective work products may suffer, since the goals of the officer and the goals of the team may not be the same.

Service members who refuse to rely on civilian expertise overlook the achievement and competence of those civilians; Katzenbach and Smith (1991) note this as an essential team attribute. Likewise, if civilians feel that negative consequences will result from their interactions with the military (e.g., rejection, frustration), avoidance, withdrawal and conflict may result (Stephan and Stephan,

1985). Civilians must also recognize the needs of the service members and consequence of a negative military evaluation (possible termination). If the group works together to meet the needs of the individual team members, together with the goals of the group, the team's objectives will be met.

3. Military Adjustment from Management of an Operational Environment to a Business Organization

a. Results of literature review

Bridger (1994) states that service members simply dictate to civilian employees because they are the boss and that service members assume that civilians are less responsive to the military. Woolley, et al (1986), found that civilians were critical of military knowledge and management of civilians. Markessini's (1994) quoted one civilian who stated, "Military simply do not care about civilians...they want to get whatever they can from civilians".

b. Results of research

Research conducted indicates that military should not manage civilians using a stereotypical authoritative militaristic leadership style ("I say - you do"), and found that service members who adjust their leadership style to a team-oriented leadership approach when in a civilian organization foster better IPTs. While civilian interviewees stated that service members should not run a civilian organization like a military unit, no civilian interviewed stated that the military does not care about civilians as cited in Markessini's 1994 research.

c. Implications for IPTs

A stereotypical military leadership style may have a negative affect on IPTs by discouraging effective team components, such as:

- encouraging listening and constructive response to views expressed by other team members
- shared leadership roles
- discussion of different viewpoints (Katzenbach and Smith, 1991)

If these components are not encouraged by the IPT, the result may be discouraged and alienated team participants who may not contribute to the team or support IPT efforts. IPTs with team members who fear disapproval and rejection produce suboptimal IPT products. As the literature suggests, differences that exist between military and civilians should be employed to enhance team performance. Differences that result in alienation, withdrawal, perceived powerlessness and rejection can inhibit team performance. Actions to resolve differences between the groups are discussed later.

4. Military Culture

a. Results of literature review

Existing research finds that civilians feel like second class citizens (Broedling, 1979; Wermuth, 1979; and Woolley, 1986). Particularly, Skinner (1993) found that the military do not accept civilians as part of the team. Young (1985) found that cultural differences between the groups are emphasized by the

military uniform, caste-like system of the military, military quarters, and the transient nature of the military.

If IPTs are indifferent and unaccepting towards sub-group cultures, they may not recognize the potential contributions that team members can make, and may not be effectively using the talent and resources that are available.

b. Results of research

Civilians interviewed support the existing literature. They did not state specifically that they felt like "second class citizens" but commented that service members receive better treatment than civilians (e.g., service members are given better resource support and more respect). In addition, the military "clique" provides a fraternity between service members that facilitates their communications but does not include civilians. This "clique" is facilitated by the military uniform which allows members to easily identify and relate to each other, using well established traditions and norms.

c. Implications for IPTs

As discussed in Chapter II, the literature states that cultural differences should be recognized and valued in order to benefit from the insight and different perspectives that different cultures bring to a team (Bartunek, 1996; Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). If civilians feel their perspectives are not valued by the military IPT members, because civilians are not members of the

military "clique," the IPT product may lack crucial civilian insight and support. Groups that accept only the contributions from members of their same group, and ignore contributions of other IPT members, do not use their diversified personnel resources to maximize both team and organization performance (Bartunek, 1996; Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996).

If military IPT members receive different benefits (e.g., respect and resource support) based on their military, not IPT, membership, it may act as a disincentive to the non-military IPT members who do not receive the same benefits. IPT members should receive benefits and rewards based on their IPT contributions and results (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).

Stephan and Stephan (1985) note that an individual's interaction with out-group members may result in disapproval or rejection by members of that group. Thus, civilians may fear disapproval and rejection by service members and may avoid service members as a result.

D. INTER-GROUP CONFLICT

1. Literature Review

Brown's (1983) model on intergroup conflict defines potential sources of conflict as personal feelings, group membership, and job differences. The conflicts may be based on: 1) different attitudes or characteristics of an individual; 2) placement in the organization (e.g., functional affiliation) or power within the

organization and 3) societal differences (e.g., religion or race). These potential sources of intergroup conflict suggest that conflict cannot always be blamed on the individual but can be derived from the individual's group membership or is culturally embedded at the societal level.

Jehn (1995) found that conflict may increase an individual's frustration, strain and uneasiness in a group, which may result in psychological or physical withdrawal. Brown's research adds that conflict may encourage negative stereotypes, decrease communication and increase differences between the groups; power differences may further suppress group communications. If conflict is not resolved, Jehn (1995) states that groups may spend time trying to resolve, discuss or ignore conflict instead of working on the task.

2. Interview Results

Service members and civilians interviewed did not discuss conflict as a factor of their IPT experience. As noted in Chapter IV, when asked if conflict was present in IPTs, interview subjects stated if conflict was present, it did not influence team performance and (or) was ignored. Other interviewees stated that conflict was not present during their IPT experience.

3. Implications for IPTs

While civilians and service members state that conflict did not exist or was ignored, the data presented above describing the military-civilian relationship

present many opportunities for conflict. In fact, a number of these opportunities which could lead to conflict on an IPT were identified in previous sections and are summarized here within the context of Brown's model on intergroup conflict (1983) which first addresses personal attitudes and perceptions:

- civilians are clock watchers
- civilians are not willing to make sacrifices such as traveling on their own time
- civilians must be motivated differently from the military
- military do not view civilians as team members
- service members focus on their performance evaluations, not organizational benefit
- military use a stereotypical authoritarian leadership style

Brown's model continues with the conflict produced by group association. Conflict related to group association for service members and civilians results from differences in the training, personnel and promotion systems for the two groups. In addition, civilians have a strong group association at the local level, due to their long association with a single organization at one geographic location. This latter aspect of local group affiliation is not a facet of the military culture due to their frequent rotation. An IPT should recognize the potential divisiveness of inequities derived from the two group's formal support systems (e.g., training, promotion). In addition, an IPT should recognize the potential benefits presented

from lengthy civilian associations, but must also recognize that civilian longevity may foster parochialism and a reluctance to take risks.

In contrast to local group associations within the civilian culture, a service member is associated with the larger military institution or "society" above the organization or group level. Civilians are not part of this larger military society, which focuses on traditions, ranks, mentor-protégé relationships, rules and regulations. Brown warns that the exclusion of team members due to societal differences may be a source of conflict for IPTs. IPTs should acknowledge the opportunities and challenges presented by the societal aspects of the military culture.

Along with the societal recognition of military officers, military rank inherent in the DoD also provides levels of power. Each time an officer wears the uniform, the level and amount of power is visible (i.e., a General Officer has more power than a Major). The different power levels due to military rank, may lead to conflict avoidance, due to low-powered civilians' fear of repercussion when addressing contentious issues with high-power officers. This avoidance of conflict can result in dysfunctional team performance. The lack of constructive IPT conflict between IPT members with different power levels, and their unwillingness to disagree, may result in a group that simply defers to the high-powered members of the team.

As noted, although not reported by interviewees as an issue, the potential for conflict between the groups is great. If methods that resolve or implement conflict are not employed, the presence or absence of conflict may ultimately affect IPT productivity and performance.

E. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

1. Results of Literature Review

Brown (1983) states that conflict is present in most organizations but usually goes unrecognized. His model proposes that a moderate level of conflict is desired for a group - too much or too little may be harmful. Brown states that in order to manage conflict, it must first be diagnosed by reviewing the attitudes, behavior and structure of a group. In addition, the power structure of the organization and societal differences must be analyzed and managed to ensure constructive conflict.

Conflict reduction may include training and orientation, insuring minority group acceptance, career development, mentoring and social events (Cox, 1991), institutional and legislative change and decrease of stereotypes by increased personal contact (Messick and Mackie, 1989). Ware and Barnes (1991) present three strategies for managing interpersonal conflict: bargaining, controlling, and constructive confrontation. These conflict management techniques may be useful to the IPT leader when conflict is present.

2. Interview Results

As previously noted, interview subjects stated that IPT conflict either did not exist or was avoided by the group. Given the data previously presented, this assessment suggests that the conflict may be "too little" (Brown, 1983) and critical differences are being avoided.

3. Implications for IPTs

There is evidence from the literature reviewed to support this research that intergroup conflict, when ignored or avoided, may have a negative impact on IPT effectiveness. For example, different group communication styles may create difficulties for effective team functioning. The military leadership and communication style and desire to take charge may result in a team that does only what the service member orders. Civilian team members may be unwilling to challenge a service member's opinion and may not express their viewpoints due to the desire to avoid conflict. The result may be an ineffective team which does not utilize the potential contribution of all IPT members, resulting in a suboptimal IPT product.

In addition, since DoD is a bureaucracy which is built on the rank and grade of its employees, the power differences cited in Brown's (1983) model are especially important to DoD IPTs since the differences may promote minimal conflict between the groups. IPT "low power" groups may fear the negative

consequences of conflict with a "high power" (e.g., high ranking military) group; an IPT "high power" group may desire a minimal level of conflict. The result of conflict avoidance for DoD IPTs may ultimately be the procurement of weapon systems which are not cost or mission effective.

To encourage conflict and discussion of different views between groups, Brown (1983) suggests that high powered IPT members learn the impact that productive conflict has on an IPT, and low powered IPT members be provided assurance that their productive conflict with high power group members will not be punished. To improve the flow of information between these groups, Brown suggests that trustworthy protection be provided to the low powered group and effective education be provided to the high powered group. If productive conflict is desired to produce effective IPT results, it must be nurtured and rewarded throughout the organization.

Brown cautions that the boundary between too little conflict and too much conflict is easily crossed. Should the level of IPT conflict be raised above a constructive level, the author suggests conflict management methods which may be employed by an IPT. To change attitudes of each group towards the other:

- provide training about the other group's culture
- establish civilian-military mentor-protégé relationships
- increase exposure to the other group throughout their career

Conflict may also be reduced by recognizing structure differences (Brown, 1993) between military and civilians. These differences may be reduced by recognizing differences between military and civilian career development opportunities and varied treatment of the groups for travel on personal time, compensatory time and overtime.

Brown concludes his conflict reduction methods by recognizing and working with societal and group differences. These are present in the DoD community with the presence of the overarching military institution at a societal level and civilian group association at a local level.

Ware and Barnes (1991) conflict management techniques, which encourage bargaining or negotiation, controlling the conflict and constructive confrontation, may be used by an IPT when excessive conflict exists. Bargaining or negotiating may be employed by providing a neutral third party to bargain, giving incentives to go beyond conflict and finding a solution acceptable to both sides.

Implementation of behavioral guidelines may reduce conflict, and may include:

- establishing hours for the IPT to accomplish work
- use of military rank and formal professional titles (e.g., Dr., Ms.) when addressing each other
- accepting contributions of military and civilian IPT participants

Conflict may also be controlled by acknowledging and reducing external pressures via:

- acknowledging military performance need for report focus and balancing that with long term IPT results
- recognizing the value of civilian continuity in organization, and potential repercussions of IPT action for civilians
- providing support to make conflict tolerable

Constructive confrontation may also help reduce excessive conflict and may be achieved by the exploration and understanding of military and civilian perceptions (such as the military perception that civilians are only motivated by money) and provide mechanisms and motivation to acknowledging conflict and resolving it to the benefit of the IPT.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Interviews conducted with service members and civilians confirm existing literature in the following areas. First, military personnel perceive that:

- Civilian continuity provides historical knowledge to the organization but civilians have a parochial viewpoint, are less willing to take risks, and may wait out the departure of a service member to avoid work.
- Civilians must be motivated differently than military officers.
- Civilians are clock watchers and unresponsive to deadlines.
- There are systemic differences between military and civilian compensation for overtime and travel during personal time.

The following civilian perceptions regarding the military confirm the

existing literature:

- Military rotation provides the operational knowledge required by the acquisition community.
- Civilians state that inequities exist between the promotion and education of the two groups.
- Military should not use a stereotypical, authoritative military leadership style but employ a team management approach in an IPT.
- Civilians recognize the military clique provides advantages to military (e.g., respect and fraternity) not available to civilians

Interview results which challenge or extend the existing literature and provide new insights are:

- Service members state they provide better leadership than civilians.
- Service members state that civilian continuity, despite the potential negative impact to an organization, may present innovative solutions to problems.
- Civilians state the military over-emphasize their individual performance evaluations to the potential detriment of a team.
- Civilians state that military rotation increases an organization's training demands and does not contribute to the long term vision of the organization.

Implications for IPT action are presented below within the context of Brown's research (1993) which highlights that individual, group, and societal attitudes must be influenced to effect conflict.

To influence individual attitudes:

- IPT members should avoid conservative, firmly entrenched attitudes which suboptimize team performance.

- Service members must ensure that IPT performance does not suffer due to performance evaluation emphasis.
- Both groups should be trained regarding the culture of the other group.
- Service members may need to adjust their leadership style when working on IPTs.
- Both groups should recognize and use the operational and functional expertise of the other group to enhance IPT performance.

To influence group and societal attitudes:

- Service members should rotate earlier and more frequently through civilian organizations, despite any negative consequences, as both groups benefit from increased exposure.
- Team based motivators, other than financial, should be used to reward good IPT results.
- Effective leadership, demonstrated by service to and care of employees, is a fundamental aspect of military culture and required for IPTs.
- Teams should adopt a common approach for setting and adhering to schedules and accomplishing work.

Despite the numerous issues addressed in this research that may cause conflict between the groups, all interviewees state that conflict was not an issue for their IPTs. The implication for IPTs is that conflict is ignored and the benefits of constructive conflict are not recognized. To ensure that an IPT is productive, constructive conflict should be seen as beneficial to the team, as it promotes a more honest and open exchange of members' ideas. Constructive conflict will produce an effective IPT product which reflects members' views and capitalizes on the expertise provided by the functional and operational specialists on the team.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Section A of this chapter summarizes existing research concerning perceptions that military and DoD civilians have towards each other. Section B contains the results of interviews conducted for this research regarding the attitudes and assumptions that Acquisition Corps service members and civilians have towards each other. Section C contains predictions regarding the success of an IPT comprised of service members and civilians. Section D contains recommendations for managing group conflict to ensure IPT success. Section E cites potential areas for future research. The primary research question; "What are the attitudes and assumptions that military officers and civilians have about each other and how can those attitudes affect team performance?" is answered in the sections presented below.

A. FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE

The first subsidiary research question asks; "What does the existing literature state about the perceptions that DoD civilians and military officers have towards each other?" The existing literature, as cited in Chapter II, investigates the relationship between service members and civilians but does not address how the relationship between the two groups affects IPTs.

Within the existing literature, service members state that civilians are not responsive to their requirements, do not show respect to the military and the

primary civilian motivator is money. Civilians feel that the military does not accept them as part of the team, views civilians as second class citizens, does not provide effective leadership to civilians, dictates to civilians, and does not care about civilians.

Existing literature addresses civilian perceptions regarding military officers. Civilians feel that service members view civilians as second class citizens who are not part of the team, do not care about civilians and do not provide effective leadership to civilians. Civilians also state that the military provides advantages to service members that civilians do not have.

Existing research also states that the differences between the two groups are emphasized by the military uniform, military caste-like system, military quarters, and the transient nature of the military. Differences in the distribution of educational and developmental benefits to the two groups are noted by executive-level civilians.

Although the two cultures have some misunderstandings and hold assumptions about each other, both groups state that an effective military and civilian interface is crucial to the effective functioning of the DoD and that both groups are crucial members of the team. The literature states that the relationship between the two groups needs to be improved.

B. FINDINGS FROM THIS RESEARCH EFFORT

Subsidiary research question two asks; "What do the data state about the assumptions and attitudes that Acquisition Corps military officers and DoD civilians have towards each other?"

Interviews were conducted with twenty-three service members and civilian employees who have been involved with IPTs. Interviews conducted with both groups revealed dominant areas of bias which were expressed by a preponderance of interview subjects.

The interviews conducted to support this research validate the existing literature which states civilians are unresponsive to military requirements, civilian continuity provides organizational history but causes civilian entrenchment, and that civilians must be motivated differently than service members, but money is their primary motivator. Service members also confirm the literature which pronounces that civilians view schedules and time constraints differently than service members.

Civilians interviewed confirmed existing literature which states that service members do not treat civilians as members of the team and that the military culture provides advantages for service members that are not available to civilians. Both groups state that an effective and productive relationship between the two groups is vital to support DoD.

The majority of service members interviewed shared four major assessments regarding civilians:

- civilians work on a time clock and are not as dedicated as service members
- continuity provided by civilians is both good and bad for the organization
- money is the primary motivator for civilians
- service members are better leaders that civilians

All military interviewees share the assumption that civilians are clock watchers. Interviewees stated the civilian emphasis on time impedes the progress and accomplishments of the organization. Interview subjects also expressed frustration with the different treatment of the two groups with respect to official travel during duty hours.

Military interviewees addressed the issue of civilian continuity in the organization. Service members state that the continuity provided by civilians is both beneficial and detrimental to an organization. A civilian's history and knowledge of an organization benefits the short-tenured service member, yet the tendency for civilians to stay in an organization for long periods of time may also create a parochial civilian viewpoint and impede the progress of the team. In addition, civilian tenure may result in a civilian waiting for a service member to leave the organization if he (she) does not want to follow the service member's instruction.

Another area addressed by military interviewees is the motivation of civilian employees. Many interview subjects stated that the prime motivator for civilians is money. Some interview subjects cited pride in work performance as a motive for civilians to perform. Other interview subjects stated that training was not a motivator for civilians due to the on-going work requirements of civilians and personal obligations.

The final assessment of military interviewees was that the military provides better leadership than their civilian counterparts. Service members state that they demonstrate leadership through the care they provide to employees and the mentor-protégé relationship which is fostered between military members.

Interviews conducted with civilians revealed four major areas of civilian biases about the military.

- Military rotation has both positive and negative impact on an organization.
- Military may place too much emphasis on their evaluations and may neglect the job requirements.
- Military must adjust their management style for the DoD civilian environment.
- The military culture and the different treatment of civilians and military which results.

Civilians state that military rotation through an organization is both beneficial and detrimental to an organization. Benefits can be gained from the customer perspective and operational viewpoint contributed by service members,

in addition to providing civilians exposure to and a greater understanding of the military. Detriments noted by interview subjects are the disruption to the organization due to the frequent personnel turnover and the consequent need to "re-train" incoming military team members.

Another perception expressed by civilians interviewed is the emphasis that the military place on their evaluations. While most interview subjects understand the motivation behind this emphasis, they feel it forces service members to focus only on those tasks which will impact their performance evaluations which are not always the most beneficial to overall IPT goals. Interviewees also stated that the performance evaluation, in concert with the short rotation of the military, forces service members to adopt a short-term focus.

Civilian interview subjects expressed the view that a service member must adjust to a civilian environment. Interview subjects state that successful military leaders realize that a different leadership style is required and implement a team based style which capitalizes on the civilian expertise in the organization. Interview subjects stated that military officers would gain worthwhile experience from earlier exposure to the civilian workforce.

Civilian interview subjects expressed a bias against the military culture and the benefits it provides to its members. Civilians expressed resentment at the immediate respect and credibility a service member receives compared to the lack

of respect shown to a civilian employee of equal or higher position. Interviewees also expressed frustration with the military clique and a civilian's inability to join or benefit from it.

Both groups were asked what they felt the other group thought about them; i.e., service members were asked what assumptions and attitudes civilians have about service members; civilians were asked what assumptions and attitudes service members have regarding civilians. It is interesting to note that the groups repeated the attitudes and assumptions expressed by the other group, with few exceptions. Civilians did not repeat the assumption that money was the prime motivator for civilians, as the military interviewees stated and civilians did not state that military are better leaders. Military officers did not view their rotation and short tenure as a detriment to an organization.

Despite the numerous differences summarized here and cited in this research, military and civilian interviewees claim that these attitudes have no impact on IPT performance.

C. PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE SUCCESS OF AN IPT COMPRISED OF SERVICE MEMBERS AND CIVILIANS

Subsidiary research question three asks "What can be predicted about the success of the two groups working together in IPTs?" The literature recommends effective teams: encourage active listening and constructive response to other team members; have good interpersonal skills; give others the benefit of the doubt; and

recognize the interests and achievements of others. Effective teams share leadership roles; have individual and mutual accountability and collective work products; discuss, decide and perform real work together; and hold open-ended discussions and problem solving meetings. Good teams also have specific team purposes that the team itself delivers and measures performance by assessing collective work product (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).

Given the above characteristics of effective teams, interviews with service members and civilians indicate that these groups may have difficulty working together in teams. The military management style (dictate and take charge) may not facilitate communication or promote shared leadership roles but may force team direction. There is the potential for both groups to feel that they are not accepted as part of the team; the military "clique" may ostracize civilians and transient nature of the military may exclude service members from local civilian "cliques". The longevity of civilians in one job may present a parochial and conservative employee viewpoint which may reduce the teams' effectiveness.

If team members are not motivated to accomplish the work of the team but are motivated by other factors (individual salaries or performance evaluations), the accomplishments of the team may be affected as team members are not assessed based on collective work products. IPTs should acknowledge the achievements, expertise and needs of group members while supporting collective work products.

In addition, IPTs should establish how schedules will be set and how work will be accomplished. IPTs should also recognize the interests and achievements of team members and use member expertise to accomplish team goals.

If IPTs avoid addressing issues of conflict, team performance may suffer. Conflict management methods which surface issues when too little conflict is present and constructively manage excessive conflict should be recognized as useful IPT tools and implemented to enhance team performance.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING GROUP CONFLICT

The fourth and final subsidiary research question asks "Given the research, how can diversity be managed to ensure team success?" The research cites techniques to manage excessive conflict or raise conflict which is being avoided. Conflict may need to be introduced to a group that ignores or avoids it by providing training on its benefits and assurance that productive conflict will not be punished. If excessive conflict is present in an IPT, conflict reduction techniques include increased exposure to the other group, training and orientation, insuring that the other group is accepted, and mentoring.

Increased contact with the other group may help decrease stereotypes. Military and civilian interview subjects stated that both groups could benefit from earlier and greater exposure to the other group. Interview subjects noted differences between the educational and developmental opportunities for the

groups; the elimination or reduction of this disparity may help reduce perceived inequities that contribute to conflict and give both groups additional exposure to each other's culture.

Training and orientation regarding the other group may help reduce biases. Both groups could benefit from training which addresses the personnel, promotion and cultural aspects of the other group. This training is not currently provided on a formal basis to either group.

As stated in the interviews, mentoring is an aspect of the military culture that civilians admire. The development of a mentor-protégé program that crosses the cultural boundaries may be beneficial to both groups. This would provide exposure to members of the other group outside of the working environment, where the majority of military-civilian interactions take place.

Both military and civilian should recognize that some degree of conflict within the IPT is desirable. Interview subjects stated that while conflict may exist between the groups, it is not dealt with, but ignored. As noted in the literature, too much conflict may be counter-productive, yet insufficient conflict may inhibit communications. A reasonable amount of conflict is desired for a team to facilitate communication among team members and team success.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

1. Analogous Research Conducted by a Service Member

Research was conducted by a Department of the Army civilian employee. A valuable research endeavor may be conducted by a service member using the same interview questions. Interview responses received by the service member could be compared to those presented within this research document to determine if biases and stereotypes cited by interview subjects are repeated. Research could also be conducted by a civilian, employed by another branch of the Department of Defense, to investigate if those groups have different assumptions and attitudes.

2. Conduct Survey on Biases and Stereotypes of Civilians and Service Members

Valuable research could be conducted using a survey tool. Replies received on the subject may be more objective due to the anonymous nature of a survey. Although responses received from personal interviews may be more detailed, surveys may offer a more honest assessment of the subject by survey respondents and allow the use of broader samples to test the generalizability of these findings.

3. Conduct Research to Determine How Biases and Stereotypes Can Be Reduced

Interviews and surveys to research how stereotypes and biases may be reduced may benefit both groups by creating a more productive working relationship. As stated in the research presented in this thesis, stereotypes leading to potential intergroup conflict exist between the two groups. These areas of

conflict predict some likely degradation in the effectiveness of IPTs. Further research could target IPT member's recommendations of ways to reduce biases and stereotypes. This can be done by identifying highly successful IPTs and determining their strategies for identifying and managing the sources of conflict that derive from these two distinct professional cultures.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Amir, Y., "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1969, pp. 243-271.

Apple, Robert C., *An Analysis of the Management of Military and Civil Service Personnel to Delineate Inherent Problems Which Degrade Logistics Management*, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH, March 1973.

Bartunek, Jean, Foster-Fishman, Pennie and Keys, Christopher, "Using Collaborative Advocacy to Foster Intergroup Cooperation: a Joint Insider-Outsider Investigation," *Human Relations*, June 1996, pp.701-706.

Billig, Michael, *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*, New York, Academic Press, 1976.

Bridger, Chet, "The People Game: Hit or Miss (What Happens When Civilians and Military Work Side by Side," *Army Times*, April 1994, pp.12-15.

Broedling, Laurie A., Harvey, Paula M., Lau, Alan W., Newman, Arthur and Walters, Stephanie K., *The Nature of the Navy Civilian Executive Job: Behavior and Development*, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego CA., July 1979.

Brown, L. David, *Managing Conflict at Organizational Interfaces*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

Cox, Taylor, Jr., "The Multicultural Organization," *Academy of Management Executive*, May 1991, pp. 26-29.

Fargher, John S., *Productivity and Quality Improvement in Government: Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Productivity and Quality Improvement with a Focus on the Federal Government,* Industrial Engineering and Management Press, Norcross GA, February 1991.

Federal Quality Institute, *Federal Quality Management Handbook*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1994.

Flannagan, John C., "The Critical Incident Technique," *Psychological Bulletin*, July 1954, pp. 327-359.

Gore, Albert, *Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less: the Report of the National Performance Review, Executive Summary*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., Office, 1993.

Harris, Philip R. and Moran, Robert T., *Managing Cultural Differences*, New York, Gulf, 1987.

Jamieson, David and O'Mara, Julie, *Managing Workforce 2000: Gaining the Diversity Advantage*, Jossey-Boss, San Francisco CA., 1991.

Jehn, Karen A., "A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of Intragroup Conflict," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June 1995. pp. 104-116.

Katzenbach, Jon R. and Smith, Douglas K., "The Discipline of Teams," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1993, pp. 113-120.

Long, Gideon L., *The Sandcrab Syndrome--Fact or Fiction: A Study of the Attitudes of United States Naval Officers Toward Civil Service Managerial and Technical Personnel*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 1977.

Markessini, Joan, Lucas, Kenneth and Chandler, Nicholas, *Executive Leadership: Requisite Skills and Developmental Processes for the U.S. Army's Civilian Executives*, U.S. Army Research Institute, Alexandria VA, July 1994.

Mackie, Diane M. and Messick, David M., "Intergroup Relations," *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 40:45-81, 1989.

Milliken, Frances, "Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, *Academy of Management Review*, April 1996, pp. 147-166.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), *DoD Guide to Integrated Product Team Development*, Washington D.C., February 1996.

Przemieniecki, J.S., *Acquisition of Defense Systems*, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. Washington D.C., 1993.

Sackman, Sonja, *Cultural Knowledge in Organizations*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks CA, 1991.

Schneider, Benjamin, "Creating a Climate and Culture for Sustainable Organizational Change," *Organizational Dynamics*, Spring 1996, pp. 6-19.

Schreiber, Evelyn Jaffe, "Facilitating a Multicultural Workforce Through Team Management Theory," *Journal of Business Communication*, October 1996, pp. 459-473.

Skinner, William S., *Total Army Culture - The Civilian Connection*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, November 1993.

Stephan, Walter G. and Stephan, Cookie W., "Intergroup Anxiety," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol 41, No. 3, 1985, pp 157-175.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M., Bundy. R., and Flament, C., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1971.

Ware, James and Barnes, Louis B., *Managing Interpersonal Conflict*, Harvard Business School, Boston MA, 1972.

Wermuth, Anthony L., *An Armored Convertible?: Shuffling Soldiers and Civilians in the Military Establishment*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle PA, October 1979.

Young, Robert, *The Military in a Civilian Environment*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1985.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
   8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
   Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

2. Dudley Knox Library 2
   Naval Postgraduate School
   411 Dyer Rd.
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

3. Defense Logistic Studies Information Exchange 1
   U.S. Army Logistics Management College
   Fort Lee, VA 23801-6043

4. David V. Lamm (SM/Lt) 5
   Department of Systems Management
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

5. OASA (RDA) 1
   ATTN: SARD-ZAC
   103 Army Pentagon
   Washington DC 20310

6. Susan P. Hocevar (SM/Hc) 1
   Department of Systems Management
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

7. Linda Wargo (SM/Wg) 1
   Department of Systems Management
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

8. Gail Stenger 1
   2 Waycake Dr.
   Ocean, NJ 07712

9. Donald Damstetter 1
Attn. SFAE-IEW
Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
3 2768 00337612 0